On the equivalence of robustness to canonical and general elaborations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Pram, Kym
• 署名单位: Nevada System of Higher Education (NSHE); University of Nevada Reno
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.12.001
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 1-10
• 关键词: Game theory; Robustness; incomplete information; correlated equilibrium; potential games

摘要

A target equilibrium in a game of complete information is called robust to incomplete information when all nearby games of incomplete information have equilibria that generate similar ex-ante distributions over actions to the distribution generated by the target equilibrium. Robustness to canonical elaborations considers only nearby games with a special structure. I show that robustness to incomplete information and robustness to canonical elaborations are equivalent when the equilibrium concept in the nearby incomplete information games is agent normal form correlated equilibrium. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.