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作者：Nosal, Ed; Wong, Yuet-Yee; Wright, Randall
作者单位：State University of New York (SUNY) System; Binghamton University, SUNY; Zhejiang University; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We analyze agents' decisions to act as producers or intermediaries using equilibrium search theory. Extending previous analyses in various ways, we ask when intermediation emerges and study its efficiency. In one version of the framework, meant to resemble retail, middlemen hold goods, which entails (storage) costs; that model always displays uniqueness and simple transition dynamics. In another version, middlemen hold assets, which entails negative costs, i.e., positive returns; that model ca...
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作者：Sotomayor, Marilda
作者单位：Universidade de Sao Paulo
摘要：We replicate the Multiple-partners game of Sotomayor (1992) to yield a sequence with infinitely many terms. Each term, with more than one stage, is endowed with a structure of subgames given by the previous terms. The concepts of sequential stability and of perfect competitive equilibrium are introduced and characterized. We show that there is a subsequence, such that, for all its terms, these concepts, as well as the traditional concepts of stability and of competitive equilibrium, lead to th...
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作者：Baillon, Aurelien; Placido, Laetitia
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam; City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY)
摘要：Recent applications have demonstrated the crucial role of decreasing absolute ambiguity aversion in financial and saving decisions. Yet, most ambiguity models predict that ambiguity aversion remains constant when individuals become better off overall. We propose the first tests of constant absolute and relative ambiguity aversion, using simple variations of the Ellsberg paradoxes. Our tests are axiomatically founded and grounded in the theoretical literature. We implemented these tests in an e...
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作者：Mukherjee, Saptarshi; Muto, Nozomu; Ramaekers, Eve; Sen, Arunava
作者单位：Indian Institute of Technology System (IIT System); Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) - Delhi; Yokohama National University; Universite Catholique Louvain; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
摘要：We show that the Pareto correspondence can be implemented in weakly undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms. This resolves a question raised in Borgers (1991). The result is also extended to show that all social choice correspondences satisfying tops-inclusivity and a requirement called the seconds-property can be implemented. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Skowron, Piotr; Faliszewski, Piotr; Slinko, Arkadii
作者单位：University of Warsaw; AGH University of Krakow; University of Auckland
摘要：Committee scoring rules form a rich class of aggregators of voters' preferences for the purpose of selecting subsets of candidates of a given size. We provide an axiomatic characterization of committee scoring rules in the spirit of celebrated Young's characterization of single-winner scoring rules. We show that committee scoring rules are characterized by the set of four standard axioms: symmetry, consistency, continuity and Pareto dominance. In the course of our proof, we introduce and axiom...
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作者：Cai, Zhifeng
作者单位：Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick
摘要：This paper studies the role of information acquisition in propagating/stabilizing uncertainty shocks in a dynamic financial market. In a static world, uncertainty raises the value of information, which encourages more information acquisition. In a dynamic world, however, uncertainty can depress information acquisition through a dynamic complementarity channel: More uncertainty induces future investors to trade more cautiously. This renders future resale stock price less informative and reduces...
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作者：Li, Yunan
作者单位：City University of Hong Kong
摘要：This paper studies the design of ex ante efficient mechanisms in environments where a single object is for sale, and agents have positively interdependent values and can covertly acquire information at some cost before participating in a mechanism. We find that ex ante efficient mechanisms discourage agents from acquiring excessive information by pooling or randomization. The optimal pooling regions are those where the semi-elasticity of information acquisition is large. There exists an ex ant...
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作者：Stachurski, John; Toda, Alexis Akira
作者单位：Australian National University; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：It has been conjectured that canonical Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagari heterogeneous-agent models cannot explain the joint distribution of income and wealth. The results stated below verify this conjecture and clarify its implications under very general conditions. We show in particular that if (i) agents are infinitely-lived, (ii) saving is risk-free, and (iii) agents have constant discount factors, then the wealth distribution inherits the tail behavior of income shocks (e.g., light-tailedness or th...
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作者：Dilme, Francesc
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：This paper analyzes quality and reputation management in the presence of adjustment costs. A firm produces and sells experience goods over time. The firm can choose the product quality at any time, but changing it requires a costly investment. Customers learn about the product quality through a quality dependent Poisson process. We characterize reputational dynamics, showing that the arrival of news may generate jumps in both the firm's quality choice and its reputation. We characterize the se...
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作者：Giovannoni, Francesco; Xiong, Siyang
作者单位：University of Bristol
摘要：We study the welfare effect of language barriers in communication. Specifically, we compare the equilibrium welfare in a game with language barriers to that in the equivalent game without language barriers. We show how and why language barriers may (weakly) improve welfare by providing two positive results. First, in a game with any language barriers, we prove that if we allow for N-dimensional communication, any equilibrium outcome of the equivalent game without language barriers can be repli...
