Persuasion with limited communication capacity

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Le Treust, Mael; Tomala, Tristan
• 署名单位: CY Cergy Paris Universite; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); CNRS - Institute for Information Sciences & Technologies (INS2I); Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2019.104940
• 发表日期: 2019
• 关键词: Bayesian persuasion; Communication channel; Mutual information

摘要

We consider a Bayesian persuasion problem where the persuader and the decision maker communicate through an imperfect channel that has a fixed and limited number of messages and is subject to exogenous noise. We provide an upper bound on the payoffs the persuader can secure by communicating through the channel. We also show that the bound is tight, i.e., if the persuasion problem consists of a large number of independent copies of the same base problem, then the persuader can achieve this bound arbitrarily closely by using strategies that tie all the problems together. We characterize this optimal payoff as a function of the information-theoretic capacity of the communication channel. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.