Social pressure, transparency, and voting in committees

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Name-Correa, Alvaro J.; Yildirim, Huseyin
• 署名单位: Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; Duke University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2019.104943
• 发表日期: 2019
• 关键词: committee; Blame; TRANSPARENCY; Social pressure

摘要

We examine the consequences of vote transparency in committees whose members fear being blamed by interested observers for casting an unfavorable vote. We show that while individually undesirable, such social pressure can improve the collective decision by mitigating a voting externality. Hence, organizations may adopt public voting when the fear of blame is too little, and secret voting when the fear is too much. We also show that public voting is particularly desirable in committees with overly biased members or overly biased voting rules against the alternative. Anecdotal evidence supports our findings. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.