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作者：Aguiar, Mark; Amador, Manuel
作者单位：Princeton University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：Using a dual representation, we show that the Markov equilibria of the one-period-bond Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) incomplete markets sovereign debt model can be represented as a fixed point of a contraction mapping, providing a new proof of the uniqueness and existence of equilibrium in the benchmark sovereign debt model. The arguments can be extended to incorporate re-entry probabilities after default when the shock process is iid. Our representation of the equilibrium bears many similarities...
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作者：Battigalli, P.; Francetich, A.; Lanzani, G.; Marinacci, M.
作者单位：Bocconi University; Bocconi University; University of Washington; University of Washington Bothell; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We consider an ambiguity averse, sophisticated decision maker facing a recurrent decision problem where information is generated endogenously. In this context, we study self-confirming actions as the outcome of a process of active experimentation. We provide inter alia a learning foundation for self-confirming equilibrium with model uncertainty (Battigalli et al., 2015), and we analyze the impact of changes in ambiguity attitudes on convergence to self-confirming equilibria. We identify condit...
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作者：Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit; Lehrer, Ehud
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; INSEAD Business School
摘要：We consider two-player repeated games, where the players observe their own payoffs with a positive probability. Typically, a player observes neither the other's actions nor her own payoffs. We show that when costly communication is available to the players and when they are patient enough, being aware of her own payoffs suffices to provide the players with any strictly efficient payoff by sequential equilibrium. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Bilbiie, Florin O.
作者单位：University of Lausanne; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
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作者：Baruch, Shmuel; Glosten, Lawrence R.
作者单位：Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah; Columbia University
摘要：Perfect competition in liquidity provision in limit order markets is characterized by a tail expectation condition (Glosten 1994). In this paper, we model imperfect competition in schedules by infinitely many liquidity suppliers, quoting on a limit order book. We show that there are zero-rent mixed-strategy equilibria featuring finite numbers of active liquidity suppliers. None of the equilibria satisfies the competitive outcome, not even on average. Considering a sequence of equilibria with t...
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作者：Azacis, Helmuts; Vida, Peter
作者单位：Cardiff University; CY Cergy Paris Universite
摘要：We characterize the social choice functions that are repeatedly implementable. The necessary and sufficient condition is formulated in terms of the equilibrium payoff set of an associated repeated game. It follows that the implementability of a function can be tested numerically by approximating the equilibrium payoff set. Additionally, with the help of our characterization, we demonstrate that an efficient function is implementable if and only if it satisfies a weaker version of Maskin monoto...
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作者：Bade, Sophie
作者单位：University of London; Royal Holloway University London; Max Planck Society
摘要：The crawler is a new efficient, strategyproof, and individually rational mechanism for housing markets with single-peaked preferences. In a housing market each agent is endowed with exactly one house. These houses are ordered - by their size for example - and all agents preferences are single-peaked with respect to that order. The crawler screens agents in order of their houses' sizes, starting with the smallest. The first agent who does not want to move to a larger house is matched with his m...
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作者：Rudiger, Jesper; Vigier, Adrien
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; BI Norwegian Business School
摘要：We examine an analyst with career concerns making cheap talk recommendations to a sequence of traders, each of whom possesses private information concerning the analyst's ability. The recommendations of the analyst influence asset prices that are then used to evaluate the analyst. An endogeneity problem thus arises. In particular, if the reputation of the analyst is sufficiently high then an incompetent but strategic analyst is able to momentarily hide her type. An equilibrium in which the mar...
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作者：Charness, Gary; Levin, Dan; Schmeidler, David
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; Tel Aviv University; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：We study how subjects with identical public data first make estimates and then bid in common-value environments. The data presented rows of numbers and values associated with them by our (undisclosed) rule. Subjects were asked to estimate the missing value in the last row with only the numbers given, and then bid for that value in a second-price auction. There is no presumption of commonly-known distributions, yet we derive necessary conditions for equilibrium. The strong winner's curse that w...
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作者：Laohakunakorn, Krittanai; Levy, Gilat; Razin, Ronny
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We analyze auctions when individuals have ambiguity over the joint information structures generating the valuations and signals of players. We analyze how two standard auction effects interact with the ambiguity of bidders over correlation structures. First, a competition effect arises when different beliefs about the correlation between bidders' valuations imply different likelihoods of facing competitive bids. Second, a winner's value effect arises when different beliefs imply different infe...
