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作者:Chatterji, Shurojit; Zeng, Huaxia
作者单位:Singapore Management University; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要:We study random mechanism design in an environment where the set of alternatives has a Cartesian product structure. We first show that all generalized random dictatorships are sd-strategy-proof on a minimally rich domain if and only if all preferences are top-separable. We call a domain satisfying top-separability a multidimensional domain, and furthermore generalize the notion of connectedness (Monjardet, 2009) to a broad class of multidimensional domains: connected(+) domains. We show that i...
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作者:Myatt, David P.; Wallace, Chris
作者单位:University of London; London Business School; University of Manchester
摘要:In an asymmetric coordination (or anti-coordination) game, players acquire and use signals about a payoff-relevant fundamental from multiple costly information sources. Some sources have greater clarity than others, and generate signals that are more correlated and so more public. Players wish to take actions close to the fundamental but also close to (or far away from) others' actions. This paper studies how asymmetries in players' coordination motives, represented as the weights that link pl...
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作者:Dindo, Pietro
作者单位:Universita Ca Foscari Venezia
摘要:In this paper, I consider an exchange economy with complete markets where agents have heterogeneous beliefs and, possibly, preferences, and investigate the Market Selection Hypothesis that speculation rewards the agent with the most accurate beliefs. First, on the methodological level, I derive the relative consumption dynamics as a function of agents' effective discount factors, related to consumption decisions across time, and agents' effective beliefs, related to consumption decisions acros...
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作者:He, Wei; Sun, Yeneng
作者单位:Chinese University of Hong Kong; National University of Singapore; National University of Singapore
摘要:A general condition called coarser inter-player information is introduced and shown to be necessary and sufficient for the validity of several fundamental properties on pure-strategy equilibria in Bayesian games, such as existence, purification from behavioral strategies, and convergence for a sequence of games. Our sufficiency results cover various earlier results on pure-strategy equilibria in Bayesian games as special cases. New applications are presented as illustrative examples, including...
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作者:Bolton, Patrick; Wang, Neng; Yang, Jinqiang
作者单位:National Bureau of Economic Research; Columbia University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Shanghai Institute of International Finance & Economics
摘要:We develop an integrated theory of investment, seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), liquidation, and corporate savings under uncertainty for a financially constrained firm, which features endogenous growth options, abandonment options, and payout policies. Facing costly external financing, the firm prefers to fund its investment internally, so that its optimal policies and value depend on both its earnings fundamentals and liquidity holdings. The firm values not only real flexibility but also fin...
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作者:Baughman, Garth; Rabinovich, Stanislav
作者单位:Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
摘要:In a monetary economy, we show that price dispersion arises as an equilibrium outcome without the need for costly simultaneous search or any heterogeneity in preferences, production costs, or search technologies. A distribution of money holdings among buyers makes sellers indifferent across a set of posted prices, leading to a non-degenerate price distribution. This price distribution, in turn, makes buyers indifferent across a range of money balances, rationalizing the non-degenerate distribu...
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作者:Beauchene, D.
摘要:Not necessarily. I consider two firms that compete both on the research market and on the product market. Assuming the product market outcome is ambiguous, i.e., uncertainty is described by multiple distribution of outcomes, I show that an increase in firms' ambiguity aversion increases the ex ante likelihood that they invest in R&D. An increase in their risk aversion on the other hand decreases innovation. The result holds when the innovation has a business-stealing effect as in a Cournot duo...
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作者:Sihvonen, Markus
作者单位:Bank of Finland
摘要:I analyze the survival probabilities of different types of agents in a general equilibrium model with disagreement over idiosyncratic uncertainties. I find that such biases create a separation between individual and group level survival: even when the survival probability of a single irrational agent tends to zero, these agents may still succeed as a whole. Effectively the irrational agent population can survive due to a vanishingly small group of increasingly rich agents. Disagreement over id...
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作者:Delacretaz, David; Loertscher, Simon; Marx, Leslie M.; Wilkening, Tom
作者单位:University of Oxford; University of Melbourne; Duke University; University of Melbourne
摘要:Previous literature has shown that private information is a transaction cost that prevents efficient reallocation in two-sided setups with bilateral trade or homogeneous goods. We derive conditions under which the impossibility of efficient trade extends to rich environments in which buyers and sellers have multidimensional private types, accommodating many-to-many trades and heterogeneous objects. If agents can be decomposed into unit constituents, the allocation problem can be represented as...
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作者:Siemroth, Christoph
作者单位:University of Essex
摘要:When can policy makers use policy-relevant information from financial market prices and how does policy affect price informativeness? I analyze a novel setting with noise where a policy maker tries to infer information about a state variable from prices to improve policy decisions, and policy in turn affects asset values. I derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the possibility of information revelation in equilibrium, which might not be possible if the policy reaction to prices punis...