Learning to believe in simple equilibria in a complex OLG economy - evidence from the lab

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Arifovic, Jasmina; Hommes, Cars; Salle, Isabelle
• 署名单位: Simon Fraser University; University of Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute; Bank of Canada
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2019.05.001
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 106-182
• 关键词: Laboratory experiments; learning; Complex dynamics; equilibrium selection

摘要

We set up a laboratory experiment to empirically investigate equilibrium selection in a complex economic environment. We use the overlapping-generation model of Grandmont (1985), which displays multiple perfect-foresight equilibria, including periodic and chaotic dynamics. The equilibrium selection problem is not solved under learning, as each outcome is predicted by at least one existing learning theory. We find that subjects in the lab systematically coordinate on an equilibrium despite the complexity of the environment. Coordination only happens on simple equilibria, in this case the steady state or the period-two cycle, a result which is predicted only if the subjects follow simple learning rules. This suggests that relevant perfect-foresight equilibria should be robust to the use of simple rules. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.