Robust perfect equilibrium in large games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chen, Enxian; Qiao, Lei; Sun, Xiang; Sun, Yeneng
• 署名单位: Nankai University; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Wuhan University; National University of Singapore; National University of Singapore
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105433
• 发表日期: 2022
• 关键词: Robust perfect equilibrium; Admissibility; Aggregate robustness; Ex post robust perfection; Large games; Congestion games

摘要

This paper proposes a new equilibrium concept robust perfect equilibrium for non-cooperative games with a continuum of players, incorporating three types of perturbations. Such an equilibrium is shown to exist (in symmetric mixed strategies and also in pure strategies) and satisfy the important properties of admissibility, aggregate robustness, and ex post robust perfection. These properties strengthen relevant equilibrium results in an extensive literature on strategic interactions among a large number of agents. Illustrative applications to congestion games are presented. In the particular case of a congestion game with strictly increasing cost functions, we show that there is a unique symmetric robust perfect equilibrium. (C) 2022 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc.