Discontinuous and continuous stochastic choice and coordination in the lab

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Goryunov, Maxim; Rigos, Alexandros
• 署名单位: Nazarbayev University; Lund University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105557
• 发表日期: 2022
• 关键词: coordination; global games; information acquisition; Continuous stochastic choice; laboratory experiment; perception

摘要

We experimentally test theoretical predictions on equilibrium selection in a two-player coordination (investment) game. Through a minimal visual variation, our design prompts participants to play strategies whereby investing probability is either continuous or discontinuous in the payoff-relevant state. When participants use continuous strategies, average behavior is consistent with play in the risk-dominant equilibrium, the unique theoretical prediction. When they use discontinuous strategies, average behavior is closer to the payoff-dominant equilibrium strategy. In this case, the theory predicts multiple equilibria, for which we find no support. Additionally, we extend the theory to heterogeneous populations: the set of equilibria monotonically decreases in the proportion of players who use continuous strategies.(c) 2022 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).