Committee formation under constraints through randomized voting rules on separable domains

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Roy, Souvik; Sadhukhan, Soumyarup
• 署名单位: Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Kolkata; Indian Institute of Technology System (IIT System); Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) - Kanpur
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105648
• 发表日期: 2023
• 关键词: Committee formation under constraints; Random social choice function; strategy-proofness; Ontoness; Random dictatorial rules

摘要

We consider the problem of choosing a committee from a set of available candidates through a random-ized social choice function when there are restrictions on the committee to be formed and agents have separable preferences over the committees. We show that when the set of feasible committees is non -vacuously restricted, that is, cannot be seen as the set of all committees with a subset of members, a random social choice function is onto and strategy-proof if and only if it is random dictatorial. (c) 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.