The effects of rivalry on scientific progress under public vs private learning

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hoppe-Wewetzer, Heidrun; Katsenos, Georgios; Ozdenoren, Emre
• 署名单位: Leibniz University Hannover; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; heSam Universite; ESCP Business School
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105702
• 发表日期: 2023
• 关键词: Stopping game; experimentation; learning; preemption; Multiarmed bandit problem

摘要

We offer a model of scientific progress in which uncertainty resolves over time. We show that rivalry leads to less experimentation, extending results for preemption games to experimentation with uncertain outcomes. We compare experimentation duration and welfare when experimental outcomes are publicly versus privately observable. We show that public learning can generate more experimentation and higher welfare when uncertainty about the feasibility of a breakthrough is large; breakthroughs are rare even when they are feasible; and experiments produce results infrequently. Our results shed light on recent criticism of the science system.& COPY; 2023 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons .org /licenses /by /4 .0/).