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作者：Bertoletti, P; Poletti, C
作者单位：University of London; Birkbeck University London; Catholic University of the Sacred Heart
摘要：Martin models Cournot firms with informational asymmetries on costs to investigate the relation between X-inefficiency and the number of firms. He argues that an increase in the number of competitors decreases firm efficiency. We show that his results hold in a complete information model: they are due to the implicit assumption of increasing returns to scale. We further argue that a setting of adverse selection on cost and of ex post cost observability tends to isolate the intrafirm agency pro...
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作者：Burke, JL
摘要：We prove the existence of general equilibrium for continuous-time overlapping-generations models. Previous theorems exclude all non-linear C.E.S, and von Neumann- Morgenstern preferences and exclude production. Our primitive assumptions are satisfied by such preferences and by all Markovian production technologies satisfying Bewley's assumptions for Arrow-Debreu models provided that storage is possible, at some finite rate of depreciation and some positive capacity. A non-existence example sho...
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作者：Landsberger, M; Meilijson, I
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：We consider a principal-agent setting with two types of risk averse agents with different abilities to avoid losses. Abilities (types) are characterized by two distributions F and G which are agents' private information. All agents have the same increasing and strictly concave utility function U, under which G has a higher certainty equivalent. In this environment we derive a characterization of pairs of distributions under which a first best outcome can be achieved or approximated. We prove t...
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作者：LeBreton, M; Moyes, P; Trannoy, A
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite de Bordeaux; Universite de Bordeaux; CY Cergy Paris Universite
摘要：On the one hand, we know that, the more progressive a tax schedule, the more equally distributed the after tax incomes (U. Jakobsson, J. Public Econ. 5 (1976), 161-168). On the other hand, most tax systems involve a complex procedure where individual incomes are successively subjected to different rounds of taxation. We study in the paper the inequality reducing properties of the composition of different taxation schemes and we identify necessary and sufficient conditions for after tax inequal...
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作者：Dhillon, A; Mertens, JF
摘要：The (epsilon)-perfect correlated equilibria (PCE) are those induced by a (epsilon)-perfect equilibrium of some correlation device. The ''revelation principle'' fails for this concept-the direct mechanism map not yield a perfect equilibrium. The approximately perfect correlated equilibria (APCE) are the limits of epsilon-PCE, and we obtain a full characterisation for them. Even the APCE are ''acceptable.'' We argue in an example that, among those, it is the PCE which seem the ''right'' concept....
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作者：Kara, T; Sonmez, T
摘要：We consider the Nash implementation of Pareto optimal and individually rational solutions in the context of matching problems. We show that all such rules are supersolutions of the stable rule. Among these solutions, we show that the ''lower bound'' stable rule and the ''upper bound'' Pareto and individually rational rule are Nash implementable. The proofs of these results are by means of a recent technique developed by Danilov [2]. Two corollaries of interest are the stable rule is the minima...
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作者：Kahn, JA; Landsburg, SE; Stockman, AC
摘要：Does an observation that is consistent with a theory constitute stronger evidence for that theory if it was made after the theory was proposed rather than before (when the observation might have influenced the theory's formation)? How and why might the research strategy of theorizing prior to observation affect the conditional probability that the theory is true? Is there a socially optimal set of research strategies and on what does it depend? In a world of asymmetric information, what incent...
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作者：Sprumont, Y
作者单位：Universite de Montreal
摘要：This paper formulates the principle of ordinal welfare egalitarianism in a general model of collective choice where both the feasibility constraints and the preferences may vary. An axiomatization of all choice rules satisfying this principle is presented. The key axiom is a solidarity property with respect to changes that may occur, possibly jointly, in the feasibility constraints and the preferences. Solidarity with respect to changes in the feasibility constraints and solidarity with respec...
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作者：Piccione, M; Tan, GF
摘要：This paper studies the equilibrium bidding behavior in a first-price sealed-bid auction when the number of informed bidders is not common knowledge. Both the independent private values and the common value cases are analyzed, under the assumption that a ''neutral'' signal exists. In equilibrium, experts and non-experts draw their bids from distinct supports: experts bid in the upper and lower tail of the bidding distribution and non-experts randomize their bids in between. For common values, i...
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作者：Battigalli, P
摘要：This paper evaluates different refinements of subgame perfection, which rely on different restrictions on players' assessments, using a simple and intuitive independence property for conditional probability systems on the space of strategy profiles. This independence property is necessary for full consistency of assessments, and it is equivalent to full consistency in games with observable deviators. Furthermore, while every conditional system on the strategies satisfying the independence prop...
