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作者：Conlon, JR
摘要：It is shown that, in finitely repeated smooth games, epsilon-equilibria are capable of supporting full cooperation up to very near the end of the horizon, with very small amounts of irrationality, epsilon. Furthermore, behavior, even near the end of the horizon, is highly insensitive to the amount of irrationality assumed. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
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作者：Smith, JL; Levin, D
摘要：This paper ranks first- and second-price, independent value auctions with risk-averse bidders when entry is endogenous. Unless bidders exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA), the ''fixed-n'' ranking of first-price over second-price is sustained. However, when bidders exhibit DARA, we show that the effect of entry sometimes reverses the ranking. We discuss how elements of the auction environment such as the relative magnitude of entry costs, the number of potential bidders, and the de...
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作者：Hayashi, F; Matsui, A
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We present an infinite horizon model with capital in which fiat money and barter are two competing means of payment. Fiat money has value because barter is limited by the extent of a double coincidence of wants. The pattern of exchange rally involves both money and barter. We find that the Chicago rule is sufficient for Pareto efficiency, while nominal interest smoothing is necessary. For a specific utility function we provide a complete characterization of the patterns of exchange and calcula...
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作者：Gottardi, P; Hens, T
作者单位：Harvard University; University of Bonn
摘要：The paper studies the role and the formulation of the survival assumption with incomplete markets. We are able to show the existence of a competitive equilibrium when the agents' endowments lie on the boundary of their consumption set However, for this some additional assumptions with respect to the complete market case are needed. These are joint restrictions on the asset structure and the distribution of the endowments and preferences. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
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作者：Luo, YF; Yue, CY; Ting, C
摘要：A lexicographic weak ordering for preferences between subsets is defined for a weak signed order. The lexicographic ordering satisfies Fishburn's monotone extension relations and is determined by two extension axioms. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
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作者：Dockner, EJ; Sorger, G
作者单位：University of Vienna
摘要：We consider a model in which two agents share access to the same stock of a productive asset and study the implications of non-cooperative consumption behavior over time. Under standard assumptions on the production function we construct infinitely many Nash equilibria, all of which consist of stationary Markovian strategies. These equilibria result in overconsumption so that the uniquely determined long-run asset stock is too low as compared to the cooperative solution. However, in the limit ...
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作者：Legros, P; Newman, AF
作者单位：Columbia University
摘要：We construct a general equilibrium model of firm formation in which organization is endogenous. Firms are coalitions of agents providing effort and investment capital. Effort is unobservable unless a fixed monitoring cost is paid, and borrowing is subject to a costly state verification problem. Because incentives vary with an agent's wealth, different types of agents become attractive firm members under different circumstances. When borrowing is not costly, firms essentially consist of one typ...
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作者：Fields, GS; Ok, EA
作者单位：New York University
摘要：Income mobility may be seen as arising from two sources: (i) the transfer of income among individuals with total income held constant, and (ii) a change in the total amount of income available. In this paper, we propose several sensible properties defining the concept of income mobility and show that an easily applicable measure of mobility is uniquely implied by these properties. We also show that the resulting measure is additively decomposable into the two sources listed above, namely, mobi...
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作者：Volij, O
摘要：Aumann and Brandenburger [Econometrica 63 (1995), 1161-1180.] provide sufficient conditions on the knowledge of the players in a game for their beliefs to constitute a Nash equilibrium. They assume, among other things, mutual knowledge of rationality. By rationality of a player, it is meant that the action chosen by him maximizes his expected utility, given his beliefs. There is, however, no need to restrict the notion of rationality to expected utility maximization. This paper shows that thei...
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作者：Hart, S; Heifetz, A; Samet, D
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Universite Catholique Louvain; Tel Aviv University; Tel Aviv University
摘要：We introduce a new knowledge operator called ''knowing whether.'' Knowing whether an event occurred means either knowing that it occurred or knowing that it did not occur. We demonstrate the following difference between ''knowing whether'' and ''knowing that.'' In a multiple agent model, a sequence of events generated by successively applying ''knowing that'' operators, or their negations, may be contradictory. But when ''knowing whether'' operators are used instead, the sequence is never cont...
