A simple model of expert and non-expert bidding in first-price auctions
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Piccione, M; Tan, GF
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1996.0101
发表日期：
1996
页码：
501-515
关键词：
摘要：
This paper studies the equilibrium bidding behavior in a first-price sealed-bid auction when the number of informed bidders is not common knowledge. Both the independent private values and the common value cases are analyzed, under the assumption that a ''neutral'' signal exists. In equilibrium, experts and non-experts draw their bids from distinct supports: experts bid in the upper and lower tail of the bidding distribution and non-experts randomize their bids in between. For common values, it is shown that the seller's expected revenue always decreases with the probability of a bidder being informed when this probability is small. The opposite result is shown for the case of independent private values. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.