Journal of Economic Theory

最新文章

• Incentive-efficient equilibria of two-party sealed-bid bargaining games AI翻译
  作者：Gresik, TA
  摘要：Consider a two-party bargaining problem in which each party has private value information. This paper derives a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for a strictly increasing equilibrium of a game in which bargaining takes place via a sealed-bid mechanism to be interim incentive efficient. In addition, this paper describes conditions under which an interim incentive efficient allocation can be realized via an equilibrium of a sealed-bid bargaining game that is also ex post individually r...
• Complicated endogenous business cycles under gross substitutability AI翻译
  作者：deVilder, R
  作者单位：University of Amsterdam
  摘要：In this paper we investigate the global behaviour of the output equilibrium time paths in a two-dimensional overlapping generations model with productive investment and capital accumulation, where agents behave rationally and markets are competitive. We show that equilibrium time paths can converge to complicated (chaotic) attractors as well as periodic attractors when the substitution effect dominates the income effect everywhere. The occurrence of complicated equilibrium paths is guaranteed ...
• Endogenous formation of cooperation structures AI翻译
  作者：Qin, CZ
  摘要：I consider a cooperation-formation game in which players choose independently with whom they wish to cooperate in a given coalitional game, and players' payoffs follow a solution imposed on the coalitional game. I study the resulting equilibrium cooperation structure and how cooperation evolves under best-response and fictitious-play learning processes. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
• Optimal contract, imperfect output observation, and limited liability AI翻译
  作者：Lawarree, JP; VanAudenrode, MA
  作者单位：Laval University
  摘要：We study the optimal contract when output is imperfectly observed. When all parties are risk neutral and the agent has unlimited liability, the optimal contract remains the same regardless of whether the output is perfectly or imperfectly observed. When the agent's liability becomes limited, the optimal contract changes profoundly under imperfect information. We show that the hi,oh-productivity agent never produces at first-best and may be required to produce an effort lower than the one requi...
• Dutta's minimal covering set and Shapley's saddles AI翻译
  作者：Duggan, J; LeBreton, M
  作者单位：Aix-Marseille Universite; Institut Universitaire de France
  摘要：We prove the existence and uniqueness of the weak saddle, a solution due to Shapley, for a class of zero-sum games including tournament games, as defined by Laffond, Laslier, and Le Breton. We then show that the minimal covering set of a tournament, proposed by Dutta, coincides with the weak saddle of the corresponding tournament game. This provides a positive foundation for the minimal covering set and yields, as corollaries, Dutta's existence and uniqueness theorems for the minimal covering ...
• Reputation and entry deterrence under short-run ownership of a firm AI翻译
  作者：Aoyagi, M
  摘要：This paper discusses the role of the changing ownership of a long-run firm facing a sequence of potential entrants to its market, When there is uncertainty about the firm's type (about its cost of taking an aggressive action) that is observed only by the current owner, it is shown that there exists an equilibrium in which each generation of owners takes the same aggressive action to deter entry regardless of the type. Under a natural refinement of equilibrium beliefs, the path induced by this ...
• D1 signaling equilibria with multiple signals and a continuum of types AI翻译
  作者：Ramey, G
  摘要：This note extends Cho and Sobel's (J. Econ. Theory 50 (1990), 381-413) existence and uniqueness results for D1 equilibria of signaling games with multiple signals by (i) specifying that types are drawn from a compact interval, and (ii) invoking a more general incentive monotonicity condition, due to Engers (Econometrica 55 (1987), 663-674) which extends the usual single-crossing property of one-signal models. For certain classes of payoff functions, the complete-information distortion result o...
• Arrow's theorem in public good environments with convex technologies AI翻译
  作者：Duggan, J
  摘要：I prove a version of Arrow's theorem for public good environments assuming that individuals have standard economic preferences and that the domain of feasible sets consists of the convex, compact, comprehensive subsets of alternatives. This improves a result of Donaldson and Weymark (J. Econ. Theory 46 (1988), 291-308), who employ non-convex feasible sets in their proof. I use their strengthened independence condition, and I interpret my result as a reflection of its undue restrictiveness. As ...
• Correlated equilibrium of cournot oligopoly competition AI翻译
  作者：Liu, LH
  摘要：This paper shows that there is a unique correlated equilibrium, which is the unique Nash equilibrium, for the standard Cournot oligopoly model with linear demand and asymmetric, linear costs. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
• Rationalizable predatory pricing AI翻译
  作者：Roth, D
  摘要：This paper shows that predatory pricing is rationalizable and is in this sense rational even when there is no uncertainty regarding structural parameters such as cost or demand. Predatory pricing is modelled as a war of attrition. All strategy profiles-including all possible lengths of predatory battles-are rationalizable in the extensive form. Despite this, weak restrictions on beliefs combined with rationalizability have drastic implications for the play of the game. (C) 1996 Academic Press,...