Axiomatizing ordinal welfare egalitarianism when preferences may vary
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Sprumont, Y
署名单位：
Universite de Montreal
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1996.0005
发表日期：
1996
页码：
77-110
关键词：
摘要：
This paper formulates the principle of ordinal welfare egalitarianism in a general model of collective choice where both the feasibility constraints and the preferences may vary. An axiomatization of all choice rules satisfying this principle is presented. The key axiom is a solidarity property with respect to changes that may occur, possibly jointly, in the feasibility constraints and the preferences. Solidarity with respect to changes in the feasibility constraints and solidarity with respect to changes in the preferences together imply only a weaker form of egalitarianism. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.