Strategic independence and perfect Bayesian equilibria
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Battigalli, P
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1996.0082
发表日期：
1996
页码：
201-234
关键词：
摘要：
This paper evaluates different refinements of subgame perfection, which rely on different restrictions on players' assessments, using a simple and intuitive independence property for conditional probability systems on the space of strategy profiles. This independence property is necessary for full consistency of assessments, and it is equivalent to full consistency in games with observable deviators. Furthermore, while every conditional system on the strategies satisfying the independence property corresponds to a generally reasonable extended assessment as defined by Fudenberg and Tirole [J. Econ. Theory 53 (1991), 236-260], such extended assessments may violate independence, full consistency, and invariance with respect to interchanging of essentially simultaneous moves. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.