A note on endogenous firm efficiency in Cournot models of incomplete information
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Bertoletti, P; Poletti, C
署名单位：
University of London; Birkbeck University London; Catholic University of the Sacred Heart
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1996.0120
发表日期：
1996
页码：
303-310
关键词：
摘要：
Martin models Cournot firms with informational asymmetries on costs to investigate the relation between X-inefficiency and the number of firms. He argues that an increase in the number of competitors decreases firm efficiency. We show that his results hold in a complete information model: they are due to the implicit assumption of increasing returns to scale. We further argue that a setting of adverse selection on cost and of ex post cost observability tends to isolate the intrafirm agency problem from what happens inside the product market, leaving firm efficiency unaffected by the degree of competition. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.