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作者:Mitra, T
摘要:This paper explores the precise extent of discounting needed to generate period-three cycles in a standard aggregative dynamic optimization framework. It is shown that there is a ''universal constant'', M = [(root 5 - 1)/2](2) approximate to 0.3819, such that (i) if an optimal program of any dynamic optimization model exhibits a period-three cycle, then the discount factor is less than M; and (ii) if the discount factor is smaller than M, then it is possible ro construct a transition possibili...
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作者:Hurkens, S
摘要:We investigate the consequences of allowing some players to send a costly message before a game is played. Since messages have no literal meaning, sending costly messages is also called ''burning money.'' We consider a setting with n players among which k have the possibility to burn money. We show that strategy profiles in sets that are dosed under rational behavior yield all players that have the possibility to burn, their preferred outcome. Moreover, in such equilibria no money is actually ...
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作者:Stegeman, M
摘要:Suppose that risk neutral agents have independently (and perhaps asymmetrically) distributed private valuations for an indivisible object. A mechanism assigns the object, but it is costly to send messages to the coordinator. In these circumstances, the second-price auction has an equilibrium that is classically ex ante efficient, given general opportunities to invest in information about or enhancements of own valuations. In contrast, the first-price sealed bid auction may have no efficient eq...
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作者:Battigalli, P; Veronesi, P
作者单位:Harvard University
摘要:We provide two axiomatic characterizations of a stochastic independence property for conditional probability systems, previously proposed by Hammond. One characterization relies on the theory of lexicographic expected utility due to L. Blume er nl. [Econometrica 59 (1991), 61-79]; the other relies on the theory of conditional expected utility maximization due to Myerson [''Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict,'' Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA, 1991]. Journal of Economic Literature Classificat...
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作者:Krasucki, P
摘要:We analyze n agents communicating in order to reach consensus. We show how some conditions on the topology of the communication graph (the order in which individuals communicate) are sufficient lo guarantee consensus on the value of a function satisfying the ''sure-thing'' condition. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C62, C78. (C) 1996 Academic Press. Inc.
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作者:Arya, A; Glover, J; Young, R
作者单位:Carnegie Mellon University
摘要:In applied models, the choice of a particular incomplete information structure appears to have been motivated primarily by technical convenience. The information structures used can be classified as either probabilistic or partitional. Information is probabilistic if no agent can rule out any type profile of the remaining agents and, for at]east one type of one agent, the conditional and marginal probability distributions over the remaining agents' types are not equal. information is partition...
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作者:Hong, CS; Herk, LF
作者单位:Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Columbia University; University of Warsaw
摘要:The class of mean-independent incremental risks defined with respect tfr an initial risk, or status quo, is shown tu coincide with the vector space of incremental risks generated from risks that are individually independent of the status quo. Using this characterization of mean independence, aversion toward independent risk increases, together with diversification preference for mean-independent risk increases, implies aversion toward mean-independent risk increases. By contrast, a nondiversif...
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作者:Canoy, M
作者单位:KU Leuven; University of Amsterdam
摘要:In a Bertrand-Edgeworth model with homogeneous goods an equilibrium in pure strategies does not exist. Non-existence of a pure strategy equilibrium is not solely due to the homogeneous goods assumption. In this paper I consider a Bertrand-Edgeworth model with product differentiation and I parametrize when an equilibrium exists. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D4, L1. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
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作者:Blackorby, C; Bossert, W; Donaldson, D
作者单位:Aix-Marseille Universite; University of Waterloo
摘要:On the basis of variable-population considerations, we characterize multi-valued bargaining solutions that are rationalized by special cases of the generalized Gini orderings. In addition to some fixed-population axioms, we use versions of the well-known consistency principle to characterize the single-series Gini bargaining solutions and some of their subclasses (including the utilitarian solution). By adding a replication invariance condition, we provide a characterization of the single-para...
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作者:Kuhn, HW; Harsanyi, JC; Selten, R; Weibull, JW; vanDamme, E; Nash, JF; Hammerstein, P
作者单位:University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of Bonn; Stockholm University; Tilburg University; Max Planck Society