Reputation and dynamic stackelberg leadership in infinitely repeated games
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Aoyagi, M
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1996.0126
发表日期：
1996
页码：
378-393
关键词：
摘要：
The paper studies a repeated game in which a long-run player without discounting faces another long-run player with strict discounting. The game is perturbed so that there is uncertainty in the patient player's strategy choice: she may be a rational player. but she may also be one of many irrational types who are committed to various repeated game strategies, The rational patient player's equilibrium payoff in this perturbed game is analyzed. In particular, it is shown that the lower bound on her payoff in the set of (extensive-form) trembling-hand perfect equilibria is given by her Stackelberg payoff in a dynamics sense. (C) 1996 Academic Press. Inc.