Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Dutta, B; Masso, J
署名单位：
Autonomous University of Barcelona; Autonomous University of Barcelona
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1997.2291
发表日期：
1997
页码：
464-475
关键词：
摘要：
In the standard two-sided matching models, agents on one side of the market (the institutions) can each be matched to a set of agents (the individuals) on the other side of the market, and the individuals only have preferences defined over institutions to which they can be matched. We explicitly study the consequences for stability when the composition of one's co-workers or colleagues can affect the preferences over institutions. (C) 1997 Academic Press.