Core equivalence theorems for infinite convex games
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Einy, E; Holzman, R; Monderer, D; Shitovitz, B
署名单位：
Technion Israel Institute of Technology; Technion Israel Institute of Technology; University of Haifa
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1997.2304
发表日期：
1997
页码：
1-12
关键词：
摘要：
We show that the core of a continuous convex game on a measurable space of players is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set. We also extend the definition of the Mas-Colell bargaining set to games with a measurable space of players and show that for continuous convex games the core may be strictly included in the bargaining set but it coincides with the set of all countably additive payoff measures in the bargaining set. We provide examples which show that the continuity assumption is essential to our results. (C) 1997 Academic Press.