On the voluntary disclosure of redundant information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Banerjee, Snehal; Breon-Drish, Bradyn; Kaniel, Ron; Kremer, Ilan
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California San Diego; University of Rochester; Fudan University; Reichman University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; University of Warwick
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105743
• 发表日期: 2023
• 关键词: Costly voluntary disclosure; information acquisition; Redundant information

摘要

Why do firms engage in costly, voluntary disclosure of information which is subsumed by a later announcement? We consider a model in which the firm's manager can choose to disclose short-term information which becomes redundant later. When disclosure costs are sufficiently low, the manager discloses even if she only cares about the long-term price of the firm. Intuitively, by disclosing, she causes early investors to trade less aggressively, reducing price informativeness, which in turn increases information acquisition by late investors. The subsequent increase in acquisition more than offsets the initial decrease in price informativeness and, consequently, improves long term prices. (c) 2023 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons .org /licenses /by /4 .0/).