Rational inattention when decisions take time

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hebert, Benjamin; Woodford, Michael
• 署名单位: Stanford University; Columbia University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105612
• 发表日期: 2023
• 关键词: rational inattention; information acquisition; DDM models

摘要

Decisions take time, and the time taken to reach a decision is likely to be informative about the cost of more precise judgments. We formalize this insight using a dynamic model of optimal evidence accumula-tion. We provide conditions under which the resulting belief dynamics resemble either diffusion processes or processes with large jumps. We then consider the in which discounting effects are small relative to the opportunity cost of time, and show that the state-contingent choice probabilities predicted by our model are identical to those predicted by a static rational inattention model, providing a micro-foundation for such models. In the diffusion case, our model provides a normative foundation for a variant of the drift-diffusion model from mathematical psychology.(c) 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.