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作者：Armstrong, KG
作者单位：Carleton University
摘要：This paper establishes a basis in economic theory for solving the problem of how to make comparisons of aggregate quantities and price levels across two or more geographic regions, Two new classes of relative purchasing power measures are set out and the dual relationship between them are explored. The first is a many household analogue of the (single-household) cost-of-living index and, as such, is rooted in the theory of group cost-of-living indexes. The second is motivated by a generalizati...
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作者：Yoon, K
作者单位：Sogang University
摘要：We modify W. Vickrey's ( 196 1, J. Finance 16, 8-37) mechanism for call markets by introducing the participation stage and study the efficiency properties of the modified mechanism. We provide sufficient conditions under which the modified Vickrey double auction achieves full efficiency. In addition, we prove that the modified Vickrey double auction achieves asymptotic efficiency even when full efficiency cannot be achieved. (C) 2001 Academic Press.
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作者：Pérez-Castrillo, D; Wettstein, D
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
摘要：We propose a simple mechanism to determine how the surplus generated by cooperation is to be shared in zero-monotonic environments with transferable utility. The mechanism consists of a bidding stage followed by a proposal stage. We show that the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of this mechanism coincide with the vector of the Shapley value payoffs, We extend our results to implement the weighted Shapley values. Finally, we generalize our mechanism to handle arbitrary transferable utility...
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作者：Sleet, C
作者单位：University of Iowa
摘要：Credible and optimal monetary policies are considered in environments in which the government observes a signal that is correlated with the state of the economy. When the signal is public information it is optimal for monetary policy to be conditioned upon it. The extent to which such conditioning should occur when the signal is the private information of the government depends upon the government's incentives to misrepresent information. It is shown that in some cases the Ramsey policy is inc...
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作者：Karp, L; Lee, IH
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of Southampton
摘要：If agents learn by doing and are myopic, less advanced firms might adopt new technologies while more advanced firms would stick with the old technology. This kind of overtaking can also occur if agents are forward looking and have high discount rates. However, overtaking never occurs if agents are sufficiently patient. A finite discount rate increases the set of states at which agents adopt new technologies, so more patient agents tend to upgrade their technology more frequently. (C) 2001 Acad...
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作者：Ely, JC; Yilankaya, O
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of British Columbia
摘要：A population of players is randomly matched to play a normal form game G. The payoffs in this game represent the fitness associated with the various outcomes. Each individual has preferences over the outcomes or the game and chooses an optimal action with respect to, those preferences. However, these preferences need not coincide with the fitness payoffs. When evolution selects individuals on the basis of the fitness of the actions they take, the distribution of aggregate play must be a Nash e...
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作者：Cho, IK
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：We examine the stability of rational expectations equilibria in the class of models in which the decision of the individual agent is discontinuous with respect to the state variables. Instead of rational expectations, each agent learns the unknown parameters through a recursive Stochastic algorithm. If the agents update the estimated value function rapidly enough, then each agent learns the true value function associated with the optimal action with prohability 1 and almost always takes the op...
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作者：Cole, HL; Kocherlakota, N
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：We consider a class of dynamic games in which each player's actions are unobservable to the other players and each player's actions can influence a state variable that is unobservable to the other players. We develop an algorithm that solves for the subset of sequential equilibria in which equilibrium strategies depend on private information only through the privately observed state. (C) 2001 Academic Press.
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作者：Forges, F; Minelli, E
作者单位：CY Cergy Paris Universite; Institut Universitaire de France
摘要：We identify particular exchange economies with asymmetric information in which the ex ante incentive compatible core is nonempty provided that coalitions can allocate goods by means of random mechanisms. Both the use of random mechanisms and the restriction to a specific class of economies are crucial for the result. Indeed, the ex ante incentive compatible core can be empty (i) in our class of economies if coalitions can only use deterministic mechanisms and (ii) outside this class, even if r...
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作者：Hart, S; Mas-Colell, A
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Pompeu Fabra University; Centre de Recerca en Economia Internacional (CREI); Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：We exhibit and characterize an entire class of simple adaptive strategies. in the repeated play of a game, having the Hannan-consistency properly: in the long-run, the player is guaranteed an average payoff as large as the best-reply payoff to the empirical distribution of play of the other players: i.e.. there is no regret Smooth fictitious play (Fudenberg and Levins [1995. J. Econ. Dynam. Control 19, 1065-1090]) and regret-matching (Hart and Mas-Colell [2000. Econometrica 68, 1127-1150]) are...
