The modified Vickrey double auction

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Yoon, K
• 署名单位: Sogang University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2000.2736
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 572-584
• 关键词: Double auction; Multilateral bargaining; EFFICIENCY; Dominant strategy

摘要

We modify W. Vickrey's ( 196 1, J. Finance 16, 8-37) mechanism for call markets by introducing the participation stage and study the efficiency properties of the modified mechanism. We provide sufficient conditions under which the modified Vickrey double auction achieves full efficiency. In addition, we prove that the modified Vickrey double auction achieves asymptotic efficiency even when full efficiency cannot be achieved. (C) 2001 Academic Press.