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作者：Scheinkman, JA; Zariphopoulou, T
作者单位：Princeton University; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We consider an environment of a fixed size that can be converted to another use. This conversion can be made in steps, but it is irreversible. The future benefits (per unit) from the original use, and from the alternative use, follow a diffusion process. For a fairly general case, we show that the value function must be the unique (viscosity) solution to the associated Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. We also exhibit several properties of the solution for the case of constant relative risk av...
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作者：Adam, K
作者单位：European University Institute
摘要：This paper delivers the solution to an optimal search problem where the searcher faces more than one search alternative and is learning about the attractiveness of the respective alternatives during the search process. The optimal sampling strategy is characterized by simple reservation prices that determine which of the search alternatives to sample and when to stop searching. The reservation price criterion is optimal for a large class of learning rules, including Bayesian, nonparametric, an...
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作者：Jones, LE; Manuelli, RE
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：We study how volatility in monetary policy affects economic performance in the presence of asymmetric information and endogenously chosen information structures. We consider a model in which in the absence of either feature the equilibria would be efficient. The equilibria that we find are inefficient for two reasons: first, in some cases, agents fail to trade, even though it is efficient to do so; second, agents spend resources acquiring socially useless information. The model predicts a nonl...
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作者：Lu, H; Robert, J
作者单位：University of Ottawa; Universite de Montreal
摘要：We analyze optimal trading mechanisms in an exchange economy where each trader owns some units of a good to be traded and may be either a seller or a buyer. depending on the realization of the privately observed valuations. The concept of virtual valuation is extended to ex ante unidentified traders. The traders' virtual valuations now depend on the: choice of the trading mechanism and are generally nonmonutonic. We show that the trading mechanisms that maximize a broker's expected profit or e...
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作者：Cole, HL; Mailath, GJ; Postlewaite, A
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Do investors making complementary investments face the correct incentives, especially when they cannot contract with each other prior to their decisions'? We present a two-sided matching model in which buyers and sellers make investments prior to matching. Once matched, buyer and seller bargain over the price, taking into account outside options. Efficient decisions can always be sustained in equilibrium. We characterize the inefficiencies that can arise in equilibrium and show that equilibria...
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作者：Keenan, DC
作者单位：University System of Georgia; University of Georgia
摘要：This article develops novel methods to show that the standard conditions used to obtain global stability of tatonnement depend only on aggregate substitution effects, Thus, for each condition on the matrix of total price effects implying global stability, there is a corresponding one on only the matrix of compensated price effects which also implies global stability. (C) 2001 Academic Press.
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作者：Montrucchio, L; Privileggi, F
摘要：In this paper we study the existence of bubbles for pricing equilibria in a pure exchange economy a Lucas, with infinitely lived homogeneous agents. The model is analyzed under fairly general assumptions: no restrictions either on the stochastic process governing dividends' distribution or on the utilities (possibly unbounded) are required. We prove that the pricing equilibrium is unique as long its the agents exhibit uniformly bounded relative risk aversion. A generic uniqueness result is als...
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作者：Aliprantis, CD; Tourky, R; Yannelis, NC
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; University of Melbourne; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：This paper presents a new theory of value with a personalized pricing system that naturally induces, a family of non-linear prices. This affords a coordinate free theory of value in which the analysis is without any lattice theoretic considerations. When commodity bundles are perfectly decomposable the generalized prices become linear and the analysis specializes to the Walrasian model. This happens, for instance, whenever the commodity space is a vector lattice and consumption sets coincide w...
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作者：Samuelson, L
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
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作者：Sethi, R; Somanathan, E
作者单位：Columbia University; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：This paper provides an evolutionary theory of reciprocity as an aspect of preference interdependence. It is shown that reciprocal preferences, which place negative weight on the payoffs of materialists and positive weight on the payoffs of sufficiently altruistic individuals can invade a population of materialists in a class of aggregative games under both assortative and nonassortative matching. In comparison with simpler specifications of preference interdependence (such aa pure altruism or ...
