Nash equilibrium and the evolution of preferences
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Ely, JC; Yilankaya, O
署名单位：
Northwestern University; University of British Columbia
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.2000.2735
发表日期：
2001
页码：
255-272
关键词：
摘要：
A population of players is randomly matched to play a normal form game G. The payoffs in this game represent the fitness associated with the various outcomes. Each individual has preferences over the outcomes or the game and chooses an optimal action with respect to, those preferences. However, these preferences need not coincide with the fitness payoffs. When evolution selects individuals on the basis of the fitness of the actions they take, the distribution of aggregate play must be a Nash equilibrium of G. Weak additional assumptions on the evolutionary process imply perfect equilibrium. (C) 2001 Academic Press.