Dynamic games with hidden actions and hidden states
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Cole, HL; Kocherlakota, N
署名单位：
Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.2000.2695
发表日期：
2001
页码：
114-126
关键词：
摘要：
We consider a class of dynamic games in which each player's actions are unobservable to the other players and each player's actions can influence a state variable that is unobservable to the other players. We develop an algorithm that solves for the subset of sequential equilibria in which equilibrium strategies depend on private information only through the privately observed state. (C) 2001 Academic Press.