Bidding for the surplus:: A non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Pérez-Castrillo, D; Wettstein, D
• 署名单位: Autonomous University of Barcelona; Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2000.2704
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 274-294
• 关键词: Shapley value; implementation; simple mechanism; coalition formation

摘要

We propose a simple mechanism to determine how the surplus generated by cooperation is to be shared in zero-monotonic environments with transferable utility. The mechanism consists of a bidding stage followed by a proposal stage. We show that the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of this mechanism coincide with the vector of the Shapley value payoffs, We extend our results to implement the weighted Shapley values. Finally, we generalize our mechanism to handle arbitrary transferable utility environments. The modified mechanism generates an efficient coalition structure, and implements the Shapley values of the superadditive cover of the environment. (C) 2001 Academic Press.