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作者：Boldrin, M; Levine, DK
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：Market booms are often followed by dramatic falls. To explain this requires an asymmetry in the underlying shocks. A straightforward model of technological progress generates asymmetries that are also the source of growth cycles. Assuming a representative consumer, we show that the stock market generally rises, punctuated by occasional dramatic falls. With high risk aversion, bad news causes dramatic increases in prices. Bad news does not correspond to a contraction of existing production poss...
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作者：Bloch, F; Ferrer, H
作者单位：Aix-Marseille Universite; Universite de Caen Normandie
摘要：This paper analyzes the incentives to trade and the validity of the law of one price in three strategic market games with multiple trading posts. In bilateral oligopolies, where traders have corner endowments in one commodity, all agents participate in all the markets. The law of one price holds in bilateral oligopolies and in the buy-or-sell market game, where equilibrium strategies are locally unique, When traders can simultaneously buy and sell on every market, the law of one price fails an...
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作者：Moscarini, G; Ottaviani, M
作者单位：Yale University; University of London; University College London; University of London; University College London
摘要：This paper investigates price competition with private information on the demand side. Two sellers each offer a different variety of a good to a buyer endowed with a private binary signal on their relative quality. The model provides an informational foundation to differentiation in Hotelling's price competition game. Equilibrium comparative statics is performed with respect to the prior belief and the precision of the private information. Competition is fierce when the prior strongly favors o...
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作者：Matsuyama, K
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：This paper extends the analysis or K. Matsuyama (Econometrica 67 (1999), 335-347) to the case of an infinitely lived representative agent economy, The economy grows endogenously through endogenous fluctuations, perpetually moving back and forth between two phases. In one phase, there is no innovation, the market structure is competitive, and the economy grows solely by capital accumulation. In the other phase, new goods are introduced and the market structure is monopolistic. In the long run, ...
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作者：Azariadis, AE; Bullard, J; Smith, BD
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - St. Louis; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：Legal and technological changes have made private banknote issue, or its electronic equivalent, possible, We construct a model where private liabilities circulate, either by themselves or alongside outside money. We provide results on existence and multiplicity of equilibria and characterize dynamics near steady states, Our results support Friedman in that circulating private liabilities are associated with endogenous volatility. But implementing Friedman's advice (the government should ban pr...
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作者：Jafarey, S; Rupert, P
作者单位：University of Liverpool; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Cleveland
摘要：This paper studies limited commitment and adverse selection in an economy in which private liabilities (inside money I can be used as instruments of intertemporal trade. The results suggest that in conjunction with adverse selection, the limited commitment problem may affect the behavior of intrinsically higher quality debtors more severely than loader quality ones. Nonetheless, a credit economy may function better when both problems are present than under limited commitment alone. Adding a fi...
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作者：Mitra, T; Nishimura, K
作者单位：Cornell University; Kyoto University
摘要：This paper is concerned with the relationship between the discount rate and the nature of long-run behavior in dynamic optimization models. The theory is developed under two conditions. The first is history independence, which rules out multiple limit sets. The second is a condition that avoids the reversion to a stable steady state, as the discount factor is lowered, once cycles have emerged. These conditions appear to be the minimal restrictions that would allow analysis by a bifurcation dia...
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作者：Paal, B
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：Prior to the 1930's rapid inflations often occurred in conjunction with wartime Finance, and were commonly halted by imposing or re-imposing a gold standard. In a general equilibrium framework I study the consequences of different methods of gold resumption for the dynamic path of the economy, including the behavior of the price level and the welfare of economic agents. In particular, I examine the implications of varying (a) the length of time between the end of the war and the return to gold...
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作者：Bona, JL; Li, JX
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：The primary concern of this paper is understanding how prices and interest rates respond to open-market operations. In a model economy developed by Grossman and Weiss, but with more general utility functions, we establish global existence of equilibrium paths and observe that prices and interest rates rise initially, but thereafter oscillate around a new steady state. Also investigated are optimal monetary policies wherein injections take place in more than one time period and corresponding to...
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作者：Sandholm, WH
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We study potential games with continuous player jets, a class of games characterized by an externality symmetry condition. Examples of these games include random matching games with common payoffs and congestion games. We offer a simple description of equilibria which are locally stable under a broad class of evolutionary dynamics, and prove that behavior converges to Nash equilibrium from all initial conditions. We consider a subclass of potential games in which evolution leads to efficient p...
