A general class of adaptive strategies

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hart, S; Mas-Colell, A
• 署名单位: Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Pompeu Fabra University; Centre de Recerca en Economia Internacional (CREI); Pompeu Fabra University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2000.2746
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 26-54
• 关键词: adaptive strategies; approachability; correlated equilibrium; Fictitious play; regret; regret-matching; smooth fictitious play

摘要

We exhibit and characterize an entire class of simple adaptive strategies. in the repeated play of a game, having the Hannan-consistency properly: in the long-run, the player is guaranteed an average payoff as large as the best-reply payoff to the empirical distribution of play of the other players: i.e.. there is no regret Smooth fictitious play (Fudenberg and Levins [1995. J. Econ. Dynam. Control 19, 1065-1090]) and regret-matching (Hart and Mas-Colell [2000. Econometrica 68, 1127-1150]) are particular cases. The motivation and application of the current paper corns from the study of procedures whose empirical distribution of play is, in the long run, ( almost) a correlated equilibrium. For the analysis we first develop a generalization of Blackwell's (1956. Pacific J. Math. 6. 1-8) approachability strategy for games with Vector payoffs. (C) 2001 Academic Press.