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作者：Aragones, E; Palfrey, TR
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University; California Institute of Technology
摘要：This paper examines competition in the standard one-dimensional Downsian model of two-candidate elections, but where one candidate (A) enjoys an advantage over the other candidate (D). Voters' preferences are Euclidean, but any voter will vote for candidate A over candidate D unless D is closer to her ideal point by some fixed distance delta. The location of the median voter's ideal point is uncertain, and its distribution is commonly known by both candidates. The candidates simultaneously cho...
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作者：Eraslan, H; Merlo, A
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：In this paper we consider multilateral stochastic bargaining models with general agreement rules. For n-player games where in each period a player is randomly selected to allocate a stochastic level of surplus and q less than or equal to n players have to agree on a proposal to induce its acceptance, we characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs and establish their existence. We show that for agreement rules other than the unanimity rule. the equilibrium payoffs nee...
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作者：McKelvey, RD; Page, T
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Brown University
摘要：We generalize the Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem to study inefficiencies in bilateral bargaining over a divisible good, with two-sided private information on the valuations. For concave quasi-linear preferences, the ex ante most efficient Bayes equilibrium of any mechanism always exhibits a bias toward the status quo. If utility functions are quadratic every Bayes equilibrium is ex post inefficient, with the expected amount of trade biased toward the disagreement point. In other words, for the ...
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作者：Berentsen, A; Molico, M; Wright, R
作者单位：University of Bern; Western University (University of Western Ontario); University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We introduce lotteries (randomized trading) into search-theoretic models of money. In a model with indivisible goods and fiat money, we show goods trade with probability 1 and money trades with probability tau, where tau < 1 iff buyers have sufficient bargaining power. With divisible goods, a nonrandom quantity q trades with probability 1 and, again, money trades with probability where tau < 1 iff buyers have sufficient bargaining power. Moreover, q never exceeds the efficient quantity (not tr...
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作者：Battigalli, P; Siniscalchi, M
作者单位：Bocconi University; Princeton University
摘要：We provide a unified epistemic analysis of some forward-induction solution concepts in games with complete and incomplete information. We suggest that forward induction reasoning may be usefully interpreted as a set of assumptions governing the players' belief revision processes, and define a notion of strong belief to formalize these assumptions. Building on the notion of strong belief, we provide an epistemic characterization of extensive-form rationalizability and the intuitive criterion, a...
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作者：Karni, E; Safra, Z
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; Tel Aviv University
摘要：The analysis of the behavioral and social implications of the intensity of moral sentiments requires that these emotions be quantified. In this paper we quantify the intensity of the individual sense of fairness in the context of the model of Karni and Safra [2001, Econometrica, forthcoming], That model depicts self-interest-seeking individuals endowed with an intrinsic sense of fairness, who must choose among alternative random allocation procedures to determine who. among a group of eligible...
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作者：Dutta, B; Jackson, MO; Le Breton, M
作者单位：Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
摘要：We study the impact of strategic choices of self-interested candidates of whether or not to enter an election. We focus on strategic candidacy in the context of the tree and binary voting procedures used by small groups such as committees. We offer a comprehensive analysis for the special but important case of voting by successive elimination. Strategic candidacy slightly enlarges the set of candidates that can be equilibrium outcomes relative to the traditional analysis which takes the set of...
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作者：Eraslan, H
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We consider a multilateral sequential bargaining model in which the players may differ in their probability of being selected as the proposer and the rate at which they discount future payoffs. For games in which agreement requires less than unanimous consent, we characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs. With this characterization, we establish the uniqueness of the equilibrium payoffs. For the case where the players have the same discount factor, we show that the...
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作者：Mailath, GJ; Morris, S
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Yale University
摘要：In repeated games with imperfect public monitoring, players can use public signals to coordinate their behavior, and thus support cooperative outcomes, but with private monitoring, such coordination may no longer be possible. Even though grim trigger is a perfect public equilibrium (PPE) in games with public monitoring, it often fails to be an equilibrium in arbitrarily close games with private monitoring. If a PPE has players' behavior conditioned only on finite histories, then it induces, an...
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作者：Garratt, R; Keister, T; Qin, CZ; Shell, K
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico; Cornell University; New York University
摘要：We analyze sunspot-equilibrium prices in nonconvex economics with perfect markets and a continuous sunspot variable. Our primary result is that every sunspot equilibrium allocation can be supported by prices that, when adjusted for probabilities, are constant across states. This result extends to the case of a finite number of equally-probable states under a nonsatiation condition, but does not extend to general discrete state spaces. We use our primary result to establish the equivalence of t...
