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作者：Banks, JS; Duggan, J; Le Breton, M
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; University of Rochester; University of Rochester
摘要：We prove that the support of mixed strategy equilibria of two-player, symmetric, zero-sum games lies in the uncovered set, a concept originating in the theory of tournaments. and the spatial theory of politics. We allow for uncountably infinite strategy spaces, and as a special case. we obtain a long-standing claim to the same effect. due to R. McKelvey (Amer. J. Polit. Sci. 30 (1986), 283-314). in the political science literature. Further. we prove the nonemptiness of the uncovered set under ...
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作者：Mutuswami, S; Winter, E
作者单位：University of Essex; European University Institute; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：We analyze a model of network formation where the costs of link formation are publicly known but individual benefits are not known to the social planner. The objective is to design a simple mechanism ensuring efficiency, budget balance, and equity. We propose two mechanisms towards this end; the first ensures efficiency and budget balance but not equity. The second mechanism corrects the asymmetry in payoffs through a two-stage variant of the first mechanism. Journal of Economic Literature Cla...
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作者：Silver, J; Slud, E; Takamoto, K
作者单位：National Institutes of Health (NIH) - USA; NIH National Institute of Allergy & Infectious Diseases (NIAID); University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
摘要：We describe an exchange market consisting of many agents with stochastic preferences for two goods. When individuals are indifferent between goods, statistical mechanics predicts that goods and wealth will have steady-state gamma distributions. Simulation studies show that gamma distributions arise for a broader class of preference distributions. We demonstrate this mathematically in the limit of large numbers of individual agents. These studies illustrate the potential power of a statistical ...
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作者：van Damme, E; Weibull, JW
作者单位：Tilburg University; Boston University
摘要：J. Bergin and B. Lipman (Econometrica 64 (1996), 943-956) show that the selection effect from the random mutations in the adaptive population dynamics in M. Kandori, G. Mailath, and R. Rob (Econometrica 61 (1993), 29-56) and P. Young (Econometrica 61 (1993), 57-84) is due to restrictions on how these mutation rates vary across population states. We here model mutation rates as endogenously determined mistake probabilities, by assuming that players with some effort can control the probability o...
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作者：Stachurski, J
作者单位：University of Melbourne
摘要：This paper considers a neoclassical optimal growth problem where the shock that perturbs the economy in each time period is potentially unbounded on the state space. Sufficient conditions for existence, uniqueness, and stability of equilibria are derived in terms of the primitives of the model using recent techniques from the field of perturbed, dynamical systems. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science (USA).
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作者：Dekel, E; Fudenberg, D; Levine, DK
作者单位：Northwestern University; Tel Aviv University; Harvard University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：In order to model the subjective uncertainty of a player over the behavior strategies of an opponent, one must consider the player's beliefs about the opponent's play at information sets that the player thinks have probability zero. This corregendum uses trembles to provide a definition of the convex bull of a set of behavior strategies. This corrects a definition we gave in [E. Dekel, D. Fudenberg, and D. K. Levine, 1999, J. Econ. Theory 89, 165-185], which led to two of the solution concepts...
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作者：Crawford, VP
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
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作者：Johnson, EJ; Camerer, C; Sen, S; Rymon, T
作者单位：Columbia University; California Institute of Technology; Boston University; Reichman University
摘要：We did experiments in a three-round bargaining game where the (perfect) equilibrium offer was $1.25 and an equal split was $2.50. The average offer was $2.11. Patterns of information search (measured with a computerized information display) show limited lookahead rather than backward induction, Equilibrium theories which adjust for social utilities (reflecting inequality-aversion or reciprocity) cannot explain the results because they predict subjects will make equilibrium offers to robot play...
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作者：Jackson, MO; Moselle, B
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; The Brattle Group
摘要：We examine a legislative voting game where decisions are to be made over both ideological and distributive dimensions, In equilibrium legislators prefer to make proposals for the two dimensions together, despite having preferences that are separable over the two dimensions. The equilibria exhibit interaction between the ideological and distributive dimensions, and the set of legislators who approve winning proposals does not always consist of ideologically adjacent legislators. There is more t...
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作者：Oyama, D
作者单位：University of Tokyo
摘要：This paper studies equilibrium selection based on a class of perfect foresight dynamics and relates it to the notion of p-dominance. A continuum of rational players is repeatedly and randomly matched to play a symmetric n x n game. There are frictions: opportunities to revise actions follow independent Poisson processes. The dynamics has stationary states, each of which corresponds to a Nash equilibrium of the static game. A strict Nash equilibrium is linearly stable under the perfect foresigh...
