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作者：Hayashi, T
作者单位：University of Rochester
摘要：This note gives an axiomatic foundation for utility exhibiting quasi-geometric discounting. In addition, it introduces a wider class of utility functions satisfying weakened stationarity, called quasi-stationary utility. Both are established as von Neumann-Morgenstern utility indices in a model of risk preference. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.
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作者：Fleurbaey, M; Hagneré, C; Trannoy, A
作者单位：CY Cergy Paris Universite; Universite de Pau et des Pays de l'Adour
摘要：The paper considers the problem of comparing income distributions for heterogeneous populations. The first contribution of this paper is a precise dominance criterion combined with a simple algorithm for implementing the criterion. This criterion is shown to be equivalent to unanimity among utilitarian social planners whose objectives are compatible with given intervals of equivalence scales. The second contribution of the paper is to show that this criterion is equivalent to dominance for two...
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作者：Peck, J
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：We consider a market game with a continuum of consumers, where the measure of each type is stochastic. Nature selects the set of active consumers, who make bids and offers on l - 1 spot market trading posts. Existence of type-symmetric Nash equilibrium is proven. When facing price uncertainty, best responses are unique, and a Nash equilibrium to the sell-all game is typically not a Nash equilibrium to the original game. Under plausible circumstances, consumers strictly prefer to be on one side...
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作者：Cho, SJ; Duggan, J
作者单位：University of Rochester; University of Rochester
摘要：We prove uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one-dimensional model of bargaining with quadratic utilities, for an arbitrary common discount factor. For general concave utilities, we prove existence and uniqueness of a minimal stationary equilibrium and of a maximal stationary equilibrium. We provide an example of multiple stationary equilibria with concave (nonquadratic) utilities. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Epstein, LG; Schneider, M
作者单位：University of Rochester; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：This paper axiomatizes an intertemporal version of multiple-priors utility. A central axiom is dynamic consistency, which leads to a recursive structure for utility, to 'rectangular' sets of priors and to prior-by-prior Bayesian updating as the updating rule for such sets of priors. It is argued that dynamic consistency is intuitive in a wide range of situations and that the model is consistent with a rich set of possibilities for dynamic behavior under ambiguity. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (US...
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作者：Compte, O; Jehiel, P
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech; University of London; University College London
摘要：We revisit Admati and Perry (1991)'s model of voluntary contributions to a joint project. Their main result that equilibrium contributions are small appears not to be robust to the introduction of asymmetries. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.
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作者：Robson, AJ
作者单位：Western University (University of Western Ontario)
摘要：Strategic rationality is subjected here to natural selection. In a zero-sum repeated game of incomplete information, one long-run individual is informed of the state of the world, and plays against a sequence of short-run opponents who are not. Strategies are noisy and have bounded recall. An equilibrium in these is shown to exist. Relative to any such equilibrium, sufficiently greater recall enjoys an advantage that is not decreasing in the original level of recall, thus capturing the Red Que...
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作者：Mares, V; Harstad, RM
作者单位：Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：When a seller has information that could help bidders to estimate asset value, a dictum of auction theory has been that all such information should be publicly announced to bidders. The possibility of privately revealing this information to one or more bidders is introduced. Seller in some circumstances may attain higher expected revenue through revealing his information privately. Examples show that the role of private revelation is more complex than simply generating bidder asymmetry. (C) 20...
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作者：Molina-Abraldes, A; Pintos-Clapés, J
作者单位：Universidade de Vigo
摘要：In the context of general pure exchange OLG economies where agents can have heterogeneous longevities, we provide both sufficient and necessary conditions for Pareto optimality of competitive equilibria. For the case in which all agents live for the same number of periods, we find that these conditions are equivalent. We also find this equivalence when agents can have different lifetimes, but in this case we need to impose particular restrictions on relative equilibrium prices. Moreover, we sh...
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作者：Zhu, T
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：Existence of a monetary steady state is established for a random matching model with divisible goods, indivisible money, an arbitrary bound on individual money holdings, and take-it-or-leave-it offers by consumers. The background environment is that in papers by Shi and by Trejos and Wright. The monetary steady state shown to exist has nice properties: the value function, defined on money holdings, is strictly increasing and strictly concave, and the measure over money holdings has full suppor...
