-
作者：Radner, R; Ray, D
作者单位：New York University
-
作者：Austen-Smith, D
-
作者：Cooper, DJ; Van Huyck, JB
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Case Western Reserve University; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：Our experiment tests whether strategically equivalent representations of games produce equivalent behavior when actually played. We examine representative members of the class of generic 2 x 2 extensive form games of perfect information and the equivalent strategic form games. Systematic differences exist between subjects' choices in the strategic and extensive form representations. These differences cannot be attributed to differences in subjects' ability to do backwards induction, in the sal...
-
作者：Gaudet, G; Salant, SW
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：Analyses of trade quotas typically assume that the quota restricts the flow of some nondurable good. Many real-world quotas, however, restrict the stock of durable imports. We consider the cases where (1) anyone is free to export against such quotas and where (2) only those allocated portions of the total quota are free to export against such quotas. Recent econometric investigations of such quotas have focused on the price of the durable as an indicator of tightness induced by the quota. We s...
-
作者：Kocherlakota, NR
作者单位：Stanford University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis
摘要：In this paper, I provide a possible explanation of why nominally risk-free bonds are essential in monetary economies. I argue that the role of nominal bonds is to enable agents to engage in intertemporal exchanges of money. I show that bonds can only serve this role if they are illiquid (costly to exchange for goods). Finally, I argue that in economies in which nominal bonds are essential, it is optimal for monetary policy to respond to changes in the distribution of liquidity needs. (C) 2003 ...
-
作者：Conlon, JR
作者单位：University of Mississippi
摘要：This paper considers learning rates in finitely repeated prisoners' dilemmas. If players think their opponents might be relatively cooperative (e.g., tit-for-tat or grim types), they will cooperate in finitely repeated prisoners' dilemmas (see Kreps et al., J. Econom. Theory 27 (1982) 245). However, if there are actually no cooperative types, players will eventually learn this and cooperation will break down. This paper shows that this learning is extremely slow, so it will take an extremely l...
-
作者：Rustichini, A
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：We study existence of equilibria in large games where players use boundedly rational procedures. The equilibria are different from Nash equilibria; the difference persists even when players use procedures for which the observations gathered in any period are used to evaluate the payoff from different actions. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.
-
作者：Evans, GW; Honkapohja, S
作者单位：University of Oregon; University of Helsinki
摘要：We examine the nonlinear model x(l) = ElF(x(l+1)). Markov stationary sunspot equilibria (SSEs) exist near an indeterminate steady state, (x) over cap = F((x) over cap), provided \F'(x) over cap \ > 1. Despite the importance of indeterminacy in macroeconomics, earlier results have not provided conditions for the existence of adaptively stable SSEs near an indeterminate steady state. We show that there exist Markov SSEs near (x) over cap that are E-stable, and therefore locally stable under adap...
-
作者：Samet, D; Schmeidler, D
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：We study and characterize axiomatically a class of voting rules, called consent rules, that incorporate aspects of majoritarianism and liberalism. An outcome of the vote specifies who among the voters are eligible to a certain right or qualification. Each outcome serves also as a permissible ballot. Consent rules are parameterized by the weights given to individuals in determining their own qualification. In one of these rules, the liberal rule, each individual's qualification is determined by...
-
作者：Ben-Porath, E
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Tel Aviv University
摘要：The paper studies Bayesian games which are extended by adding pre-play communication. Let Gamma be a Bayesian game with full support and with three or more players. The main result is that if players can send private messages to each other and make public announcements then every communication equilibrium outcome, q, that is rational (i.e., involves probabilities that are rational numbers) can be implemented in a sequential equilibrium of a cheap talk extension of Gamma, provided that the foll...
