-
作者：Bali, V; Jackson, M
作者单位：Michigan State University; California Institute of Technology
摘要：We study the revenue in auctions of a single object when the number of bidders becomes large. We show that all sequences of auctions belonging to a class of mechanisms have limiting expected revenue equal to the expected best-use value of the object. An important special case that is covered is common value auctions, but more generally not even affiliation of values is assumed. This provides an asymptotic revenue equivalence result for settings beyond that of private values. (C) 2002 Elsevier ...
-
作者：Ok, EA
作者单位：New York University
摘要：We consider the problem of representing a (possibly) incomplete preference relation by means of a vector-valued utility function. Continuous and semicontinuous representation results are reported in the case of preference relations that are, in a sense, not too incomplete. These results generalize some of the classical utility representation theorems of the theory of individual choice and paves the way towards developing a consumer theory that realistically allows individuals to exhibit some i...
-
作者：Shachat, JM
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：This paper reports on a set of experiments designed to discriminate among the possible sources of the failure of the unique mixed strategy minimax equilibrium of the O'Neill (1987) game. This is accomplished by introducing a new methodology for eliciting mixed strategies, which overcomes some of the difficulties encountered by previous experimental studies. The results clearly show that subjects' choices do not coincide with their minimax strategies, and that players' intended behavior is not ...
-
作者：Maruta, T
作者单位：Osaka Metropolitan University
摘要：This paper studies a stochastic equilibrium selection model for binary coordination games, Players switch strategies stochastically so that the mistake probabilities a re fully dependent on the Population states, A probabilistic behavior is said to be aspiration (imitation, resp.) oriented if strategy switches are mainly driven by the aspiration (imitation, resp.) effect. In general, a strategy switch by one player generates externalities on others. Strategies in a coordination game can be cla...
-
作者：Dutta, B; Peters, H; Sen, A
作者单位：Maastricht University; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
摘要：Public good economies where agents are endowed with strictly convex continuous single-peaked preferences on a convex subset of Euclidean space are considered. Such an economy arises for instance in the classical problem of allocating a given budget to finance the provision of several public goods where the agents have monotonically increasing strictly convex continuous preferences. A probabilistic mechanism assigns a probability distribution over the feasible alternatives to any profile of rep...
-
作者：Ghiglino, C
作者单位：University of London; Queen Mary University London
摘要：Endogenous growth theory has had some success in explaining the observed data related to the process of economic growth. However, the results of the models in this literature are typically very sensitive to their micro-economic structure. It is therefore important to understand how the growth process behaves under more general specifications of such features as the number of commodities, the number and preferences of consumers, the factors of production, and the financial and information struc...
-
作者：Mitra, T
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：Competitive paths which are efficient are shown to satisfy a terminal cost minimization condition, thereby providing a continuous-time counterpart to the discrete-time result due to Malinvaud. Using this result, competitive paths which are equitable and efficient are shown to satisfy Hartwick's investment rule, which states that the value of net investment is zero at each date. Our result indicates that Hartwick's rule can help to signal inefficiency of competitive equitable paths. (C) 2002 El...
-
作者：Sorger, G
作者单位：University of London; Queen Mary University London
摘要：We study issues related to the long-run distribution of wealth in two variants of Ramsey's model of optimal capital accumulation. First we show that, in the case where a government levies a progressive income tax, there exist infinitely many stationary equilibria in which all households own positive capital stocks. Moreover, it is demonstrated that non-stationary equilibria can exhibit complicated dynamics. Then we discuss the case where households exercise market power on the capital market a...
-
作者：Moreno, D; Wooders, J
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; University of Arizona; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：We characterize the dynamics of trading patterns and market composition when trade is bilateral, finding a trading pat trier is costly, prices arc determined by bargaining, and preferences are private information. We show that equilibrium is inefficient and exhibits delay as sellers price discriminate between buyers with different values. As frictions vanish, transaction prices are asymptotically competitive and the welfare loss of inefficient trading approaches zero. even though the trading p...
-
作者：Squintani, F; Välimäki, J
作者单位：University of Rochester; University of Southampton
摘要：This paper analyzes the equilibrium play of individuals that are randomly matched to play a contest where the dominant action changes over time. Under myopic decision making, players adopt imitation strategies similar to those observed in evolutionary models with sampling from past play in the population. If the players are patient, equilibrium strategies display elements of experimentation in addition to imitation. If the changes in the environment are infrequent enough, these strategies succ...
