Mixed equilibria are unstable in games of strategic complements

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Echenique, F; Edlin, A
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley; California Institute of Technology
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2003.10.004
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 61-79
• 关键词: mixed equilibrium; learning in games; supermodular games; strategic complementarities

摘要

In games with strict strategic complementarities, properly mixed Nash equilibria-equilibria that are not in pure strategies-are unstable for a broad class of learning dynamics. (C) 2003 Published by Elsevier Inc.