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作者：Yoshihara, N
作者单位：Hitotsubashi University
摘要：In production economies with unequal skills, this paper characterizes bargaining solutions by using axioms on allocation rules rather than axioms on classical bargaining solutions. We introduce a new axiom, consistency w. r. t. technological innovations, so that the non-weltaristic characterizations of bargaining solutions in the production economies are provided. By the characterizations, we can classify the three bargaining solutions (the Nash, the Kalai-Smorodinsky, and the Egalitarian solu...
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作者：Alkan, A; Gale, D
作者单位：Sabanci University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：Baiou and Balinski (Math. Oper. Res., 27 (2002) 485) studied schedule matching where one determines the partnerships that form and how much time they spend together, under the assumption that each agent has a ranking on all potential partners. Here we study schedule matching under more general preferences that extend the substitutable preferences in Roth (Econometrica 52 (1984) 47) by an extension of the revealed preference approach in Alkan (Econom. Theory 19 (2002) 737). We give a generaliza...
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作者：Bhattacharya, J; Russell, S
作者单位：Indiana University System; Indiana University Indianapolis; Iowa State University
摘要：We study the properties of two-period monetary cycles in simple pure exchange overlapping generations economies in which the households live for three periods. We demonstrate that these economics can support cycles under a much broader-and, arguably, more plausible-range of assumptions than the analogous two-period economies. We show that economies that fail the well-known Grandmont (Econometrica 53 (1985) 995) condition can have cycles, and that economies that satisfy the condition can fail t...
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作者：Koutsougeras, LC
作者单位：University of Manchester
摘要：We present a market game which features multiple posts for each commodity. We use this framework to illustrate the idea that in non-Walrasian markets, where individual activities influence market clearing prices, there are equilibria where commodities are exchanged simultaneously in two posts at different prices, thus defying the 'law of one price'. Such equilibria are compatible with an apparent arbitrage possibility, which dissipates whenever individuals try to take advantage of it. (C) 2003...
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作者：Moyes, P
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite de Bordeaux; Universite de Bordeaux
摘要：We examine the circumstances under which minimal equal sacrifice taxation reduces income inequality. Focusing on absolute sacrifice and relative inequality, we show that after tax incomes are more equally distributed than before tax incomes and that after tax inequality decreases with the revenue to be raised if and only if the elasticity of the marginal utility of income is decreasing. However, other things equal, after tax inequality is shown to decline as the utility function becomes more c...
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作者：Karp, L; Lee, IH
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Seoul National University (SNU); University of Southampton
摘要：In many cases the optimal open-loop policy to influence agents who solve dynamic problems is time inconsistent. We show how to construct a time-consistent open-loop policy rule. We also consider an additional restriction under which the time-consistent open-loop policy is stationary. We use examples to illustrate the properties of these tax rules. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.
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作者：Michel, P; Wigniolle, B
作者单位：Aix-Marseille Universite; Universite Marie et Louis Pasteur
摘要：This article studies the dynamics of an overlapping generations model with capital, money and cash-in-advance constraints. The economy can exhibit two different regimes. In the first one, the cash-in-advance constraint is binding and money is a dominated asset. In the second one, the constraint is strictly satisfied and money has the same return as capital. When the second regime holds on a finite number of periods, we say that the economy experiences a temporary bubble. We prove that temporar...
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作者：Coles, MG; Eeckhout, J
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of Essex
摘要：The directed search approach assumes each seller posts a fixed price and, ex post, randomly allocates the good should more than one buyer desire the good. This paper assumes sellers can post prices which are contingent on ex post realized demand; e.g. all advertisement might state the Bertrand price should there be more than one buyer, which corresponds to an auction outcome. Competition in fixed prices and ex post rationing describes equilibrium behavior. There is also real market indetermina...
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作者：Suzumura, K; Xu, YS
作者单位：University System of Georgia; Georgia State University; Hitotsubashi University
摘要：In a recent paper published in Journal of Economic Theory (101 (2001) 423-436), by Suzumura and Xu, an analytical framework was developed, which allowed us to characterize the concept of consequentialism and non-consequential ism. To simplify matters, however, the treatment in that paper was confined only to the cases where no trade-off exists between consequential considerations, which reflect the individual's preferences over alternatives, and non-consequential considerations, which reflect ...
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作者：Grüner, HP
作者单位：University of Mannheim; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：This paper studies the role of the wealth distribution for the market selection of entrepreneurs when agents differ in talent. It argues that the redistribution of initial endowments can increase an economy's surplus because more talented individuals get credit for their risky investment projects. Moreover, the redistribution of initial endowments may lead to a Pareto-improvement although all agents are non-satiable. An agent's entrepreneurial ability is his private information and there is mo...
