A search model of two-sided matching under nontransferable utility

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Adachi, H
• 署名单位: Toyo University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00085-1
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 182-198
• 关键词: search; two-sided matching; stable matching; Gale-Shapley marriage problem

摘要

in a decentralized marriage market there are different types of men and women. Agents sequentially search for mating partners and meet bilaterally in a random fashion. Upon meeting, the paired agents complete mating if both agree, and separate and continue searching otherwise. The polarization of interests between men and women appears as in Gale-Shapley marriage problems; as agents of one sex become more selective about their mates, agents of the other sex lose. As search costs disappear, the set of equilibrium outcomes in a search model reduces to the set of stable matchings in a corresponding Gale-Shapley marriage problem. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.