Dynamic common agency

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bergemann, D; Välimäki, J
• 署名单位: Yale University; Aalto University; University of Southampton
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00079-6
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 23-48
• 关键词: Common agency; dynamic bidding; marginal contribution; Markov perfect equilibrium

摘要

A general model of dynamic common agency with symmetric information is considered. The set of truthful Markov perfect equilibrium payoffs is characterized and the efficiency properties of the equilibria are established. A condition for the uniqueness of equilibrium payoffs is derived for the static and the dynamic game. The payoff is unique if and only if the payoff of each principal coincides with his marginal contribution to the social value of the game. The dynamic model is applied to a game of agenda setting. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.