A characterization of the Shapley value in queueing problems

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Maniquet, F
• 署名单位: University of Namur
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(02)00036-4
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 90-103
• 关键词: queueing problems; Shapley value; impatience independence; equal responsibility

摘要

A set of agents stand to receive a service. No two agents can be served simultaneously. A queue has to be organized, and agents having to wait should receive monetary compensations. We characterize the rule assigning positions in the queue and compensations corresponding to the payoffs recommended by the Shapley value of the associated cooperative game. We use a property of independence with respect to increase in some agents' impatience, and an equal responsibility property. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.