All equilibria of the Vickrey auction

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Blume, A; Heidhues, P
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00104-2
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 170-177
• 关键词: second-price sealed-bid auction; reserve price; uniqueness

摘要

This paper characterizes the set of Nash equilibria in the second-price sealed-bid auction with independent private values and three or more bidders. In addition, we show that any effective reserve price implies uniqueness. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.