The strategy-proof provision of public goods under congestion and crowding preferences

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jackson, MO; Nicolò, A
• 署名单位: California Institute of Technology; University of Padua
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00223-0
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 278-308
• 关键词: Public goods; congestion; Club goods; strategy-proof

摘要

We examine the strategy-proof provision of excludable public goods when agents care about the number of other consumers. We show that strategy-proof and efficient social choice functions satisfying an outsider independence condition must always assign a fixed number of consumers, regardless of individual desires to participate. A hierarchical rule selects participants and a generalized median rule selects the level of the Public good. Under heterogeneity in agents' views oil the optimal number of consumers, strategy-proof, efficient, and outsider independent social choice functions are much more limited and in an important case must be dictatorial. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.