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作者：Dubra, J; Maccheroni, F; Ok, EA
作者单位：New York University; Universidad de Montevideo; Bocconi University
摘要：We study the problem of obtaining an expected utility representation for a potentially incomplete preference relation over lotteries by means of a set of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. It is shown that, when the prize space is a compact metric space, a preference relation admits such a multi-utility representation provided that it satisfies the standard axioms of expected utility theory. Moreover, the representing set of utilities is unique in a well-defined sense. (C) 2003 Elsevie...
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作者：Gerardi, D
作者单位：Yale University
摘要：We study the effects of adding unmediated communication to static, finite games of complete and incomplete information. We characterize S-U (G), the set of outcomes of a game G, that are induced by sequential equilibria of cheap talk extensions. A cheap talk extension of G is an extensive-form game in which players communicate before playing G. A reliable mediator is not available and players exchange private or public messages that do not affect directly their payoffs. We first show that if G...
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作者：Nehring, K
作者单位：Institute for Advanced Study - USA; University of California System; University of California Davis
摘要：A theory of cooperative choice under incomplete information is developed in which agents possess private information at the time of contracting and have agreed on a utilitarian standard of evaluation governing choices under complete information. The task is to extend this standard to situations of incomplete information. Our first main result generalizes Harsanyi's (J. Polit. Econ. 63 (1955) 309) classical result to situations of incomplete information, assuming that group preferences satisfy ...
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作者：Herings, PJJ; Peeters, RJAP
作者单位：Maastricht University
摘要：This paper introduces an algorithm to compute stationary equilibria in stochastic games that is guaranteed to converge for almost all such games. Since in general the number of stationary equilibria is overwhelming, we pay attention to the issue of equilibrium selection. We do this by extending the linear tracing procedure to the class of stochastic games, called the stochastic tracing procedure. As a by-product of our results, we extend a recent result on the generic finiteness of stationary ...
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作者：Shachat, J; Walker, M
作者单位：University of Arizona; International Business Machines (IBM); IBM USA
摘要：We describe an experiment based on a simple two-person game designed so that different learning models make different predictions. Econometric analysis of the experimental data reveals clear heterogeneity in the subjects' learning behavior. But the subjects follow only a few decision rules for basing their play on their information, and these rules have simple cognitive interpretations. There is a unique equilibrium in pure strategies, and many equilibria in mixed strategies. We find that the ...
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作者：Cooley, TF; Quadrini, V
作者单位：University of Southern California; New York University
摘要：In this paper, we study optimal monetary policy in a model that integrates the modern theory of unemployment with a liquidity model of monetary transmission. Two policy environments are considered: period-by-period optimization (time consistency) and full commitment (Ramsey allocation). When the economy is subject to productivity shocks, the optimal policy is pro-cyclical. We also characterize the long-term properties of monetary policy and show that with commitment the optimal inflation rate ...
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作者：Bliss, C
作者单位：University of Oxford
摘要：Stiglitz (Econometrica 37 (1969) 382) shows income convergence in a many-agent Solow growth model with integrated capital markets (ICM). The many-agent Ramsey model (MARM) without ICM also gives income convergence. With a. MARM, equal discount rates, and ICM, convergence of incomes (as opposed to product per capita) cannot occur. These results depend upon fixed saving propensities (Stiglitz) or separable additive preferences (Ramsey). Non-convergence of incomes is shown when preferences are id...
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作者：Cass, D; Pavlova, A
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of Pennsylvania
摘要：In this paper we contrast the main workhorse model in asset pricing theory, the Lucas (1978) tree model (LT-Model), to a benchmark model in financial equilibrium theory, the real assets model (RA-Model). It is commonly believed that the two models entail similar conclusions since the LT-Model is a special case of the RA-Model. But this is simply wrong: implications of these models can be strikingly at odds. Indeed, under the widely used log-linear specification of households' preferences, we s...
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作者：Porter, R; Shoham, Y; Tennenholtz, M
作者单位：Stanford University; Technion Israel Institute of Technology
摘要：We introduce a new mechanism-design problem called fair imposition. In this setting a center wishes to fairly allocate tasks among a set of agents whose cost structures are known only to them, and thus will not reveal their true costs without appropriate incentives. The center, with the power to impose arbitrary tasks and payments on the agents, has the additional goal that his net payment to these agents is never positive (or, that it is tightly bounded if a loss is unavoidable). We consider ...
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作者：Weinberger, S
作者单位：University of Chicago
摘要：The main goal of this paper is to show that if a finite connected CW complex admits a continuous, symmetric, and unanimous choice function for some number n > 1 of agents, then the choice space is contractible. On the other hand, if one removes the finiteness, we give a complete characterization of the possible spaces in particular, noncontractible spaces are indeed possible. These results extend earlier well-known results of Chichilnisky and Heal. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
