Balanced Bayesian mechanisms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: d'Aspremont, C; Crémer, J; Gérard-Varet, LA
• 署名单位: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Aix-Marseille Universite
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2003.07.001
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 385-396
• 关键词: Mechanism design; Bayesian implementation; Bayesian incentive compatibility

摘要

In the transferable utility case, a number of authors have identified conditions on beliefs that guarantee the existence of Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms with balanced transfers. We present a new, easy to interpret, condition and we show that it is (strictly) more general than all the other conditions found in the literature. We also Study conditions guaranteeing the Bayesian implementability of all social decision rules with balanced budget mechanisms. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.