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作者：Kelly, DL
作者单位：University of Miami
摘要：We consider a general equilibrium model with a production externality (e.g. pollution), where the regulator does not observe firm productivity shocks. We examine quantity (permit) regulation and price (tax) regulation. The quantity of permits issued by the regulator are independent of the productivity shock, since shocks are unobserved. Price regulation implies use of the regulated input is an increasing function of the productivity shock because firms take advantage of a good productivity sho...
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作者：Spear, SE; Wang, C
作者单位：Iowa State University; Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：Existing models of dynamic contracts impose that it is both optimal and feasible for the contracting parties to bind themselves together forever. This paper introduces optimal termination in dynamic contracts. We modify the standard dynamic agency model to include an external labor market which, upon the dissolution of the contract, allows the firm to return to the labor market to seek a new match. Under this simple closure of the model, two types of terminations emerge. Under one scenario, th...
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作者：Benhabib, J; Carlstrom, CT; Fuerst, TS
作者单位：New York University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Cleveland; University System of Ohio; Bowling Green State University
摘要：The papers in this symposium address the issue of multiple equilibria that can be induced by monetary policy in models with capital accumulation. In particular they examine how the Taylor Principle, under which interest rates respond more than proportionately to increases in inflation, can generate multiple equilibria. They also explore the design of policies to avoid the problem of multiple equilibria and indeterminacy. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Rampini, AA
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：This paper studies how default varies with aggregate income. We analyze a model in which optimal contracts enable risk sharing of privately observed, idiosyncratic income by allowing for default. Default provisions allow agents with low idiosyncratic income realizations to repay less and thus provide insurance. Default penalties ensure that only these agents default. We show that default can occur under the optimal contract and that default provisions vary with aggregate income. We provide con...
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作者：Morris, S; Ui, T
作者单位：Yale University; Yokohama National University
摘要：This paper introduces generalized potential functions of complete information games and studies the robustness of sets of equilibria to incomplete information. A set of equilibria of a complete information game is robust if every incomplete information game where payoffs are almost always given by the complete information game has an equilibrium which generates behavior close to some equilibrium in the set. This paper provides sufficient conditions for the robustness of sets of equilibria in t...
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作者：Jehiel, P
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech; University of London; University College London
摘要：In complex situations, agents use simplified representations to learn how their environment may react. I assume that agents bundle nodes at which other agents must move into analogy classes. and agents only try to learn the average behavior in every class. Specifically, I propose a new solution concept for multi-stage games with perfect information: at every node players choose best-responses to their analogy-based expectations, and expectations correctly represent the average behavior in ever...
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作者：Modica, S; Scarsini, M
作者单位：University of Turin; University of Palermo
摘要：We provide comparative global conditions for downside risk aversion, which are similar to the ones studied by Ross for risk aversion. We define a coefficient of downside risk aversion, and study its local properties. (c) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Espino, E
摘要：In his seminal paper of 1928, Ramsey conjectured that if agents discounted the future differently, in the long run all agents except the most patient would live at the subsistence level. The validity of this conjecture was investigated in different environments. In particular, it has been confirmed in the neoclassical growth model with dynamically complete markets. This paper studies this conjecture in a version of this model that includes private information and heterogeneous agents. A versio...
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作者：Berger, U
作者单位：Vienna University of Economics & Business
摘要：It is known that every discrete-time fictitious play process approaches equilibrium in nondegenerate 2 x 2 games, and that every continuous-time fictitious play process approaches equilibrium in nondegenerate 2 x 2 and 2 x 3 games. It has also been conjectured that convergence to the set of equilibria holds generally for nondegenerate 2 x n games. We give a simple geometric proof of this for the continuous-time process, and also extend the result to discrete-time fictitious play. (C) 2004 Else...
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作者：Szentes, B
作者单位：University of Chicago
摘要：I develop a method that transforms an equilibrium strategy profile from one auction to another. The method is constructive and does not require complicated computation. This provides a new approach to revenue equivalence and extends the theorem to domains where it had not previously been known, in particular to simultaneous multiple object auctions with complete information and to auction environments having correlated private values and common values. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
