Payoff continuity in incomplete information games: a comment

• 成果类型: Editorial Material
• 署名作者: Rothschild, CG
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2004.01.001
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 270-274
• 关键词: incomplete information games; common priors; payoff continuity

摘要

Kajii and Morris (J. Econ. Theory 82 (1998) 267) provide necessary and sufficient conditions for two priors to be strategically close. The restrictiveness of these conditions establishes that strategic behavior can be highly sensitive to the assumed prior. Their results thus recommend care in the use of priors in economic modelling. Unfortunately, their proof of a central proposition fails for zero probability types. This comment corrects their proof to account for these cases. (C) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.