Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Parreiras, SO
• 署名单位: University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2004.06.006
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 210-217
• 关键词: Blackwell's theorems; Surplus extraction; Information rents

摘要

Cremer and McLean (Econometrica 56 (1988) 1247-1258) obtain a sufficient and necessary condition for full surplus extraction in Bayesian-Nash equilibrium - the rank condition. which McAfee and Reny (Econometrica 60(2) (1992) 395-421) later generalize for Continuous type spaces. This paper shows that, if the principal does not know how noisy is the agent's signal - or equivalently, when signals available to an agent can be ranked by Blackwell's informativeness and. an agent's informativeness is independent of others' information. the rank condition fails to hold, Conversely, when rank condition fails and informational rents are left it,) an agent, the model (:an be interpreted as if, the principal were uncertain about the informativeness of the agent's signal. (c) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.