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作者：Hoppe, HC; Lehmann-Grube, U
作者单位：University of Bonn; University of Hamburg
摘要：We offer a new algorithm for analyzing innovation timing games. Its main advantage over the traditional approach is that it applies to problems that had previously been intractable. We use the algorithm to examine two classical innovation problems. We find that the competition takes the form of a waiting game with a second-mover advantage either for any level of R&D costs (process innovation) or for high R&D costs (product innovation). Moreover, both models predict that the second-mover advant...
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作者：Farmer, REA; Lahiri, A
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York
摘要：We study a class of utility functions that are defined recursively by an aggregator W (x, y) where u(t) = W (c(t), u(t+1)). In single-agent economies it is known that a sufficient condition for the existence of a balanced growth path is that utility should be homogenous of degree y. In the context of a multi-agent economy we show that this restriction implies that either a balanced growth equilibrium fails to exist or all agents have the same constant discount factor. We suggest a generalizati...
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作者：Barberà, S; Massó, J; Neme, A
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Universidad Nacional de San Luis; Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientificas y Tecnicas (CONICET)
摘要：We consider social choice problems where a society must choose a subset from a set of objects. Specifically, we characterize the families of strategy-proof voting procedures when not all possible subsets of objects are feasible, and voters' preferences are separable or additively representable. (c) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Bogomolnaia, A; Moulin, H; Stong, R
作者单位：Rice University; Rice University
摘要：Agents partition deterministic outcomes into good or bad. A mechanism selects a lottery over outcomes (time-shares). The probability of a good outcome is the canonical utility. The utilitarian mechanism averages over outcomes with largest approval. It is efficient, strategyproof, anonymous and neutral. We reach an impossibility if, in addition, each agent's utility is at least 1/n, where n is the number of agents; or is at least the fraction of good to feasible outcomes. We conjecture that no ...
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作者：Beggs, AW
作者单位：University of Oxford
摘要：This paper examines the convergence of payoffs and strategies in Erev and Roth's model of reinforcement learning. When all players use this rule it eliminates iteratively dominated strategies and in two-person constant-sum games average payoffs converge to the value of the game. Strategies converge in constant-sum games with unique equilibria if they are pure or if they are mixed and the game is 2 x 2. The long-run behaviour of the learning rule is governed by equations related to Maynard Smit...
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作者：Köbberling, V; Wakker, PP
作者单位：Maastricht University
摘要：To a considerable extent, risk aversion as it is commonly observed is caused by loss aversion. Several indexes of loss aversion have been proposed in the literature. The one proposed in this paper leads to a clear decomposition of risk attitude into three distinct components: basic utility, probability weighting, and loss aversion. The index is independent of the unit of payment. The main theorem shows how the indexes of different decision makers can be compared through observed choices. (c) 2...
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作者：Chambers, CP
作者单位：California Institute of Technology
摘要：This paper studies the classical land division problem formalized by Steinhaus (Econometrica 16 (1948) 101-104) in a multi-profile context. We propose a notion of an allocation rule for this setting. We discuss several examples of rules and properties they may satisfy. Central among these properties is division independence: a parcel may be partitioned into smaller parcels, these smaller parcels allocated according to the rule, leaving a recommended allocation for the original parcel. In conju...
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作者：Spiegler, R
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：Under most game-theoretic solution concepts, equilibrium beliefs are justified by off-equilibrium events. I propose an equilibrium concept for infinitely repeated games, called Nash Equilibrium with Tests (NEWT), according to which players can only justify their equilibrium beliefs with events that take place on the equilibrium path itself. In NEWT, players test every threat that rationalizes a future non-myopic action that they take. The tests are an integral part of equilibrium behavior. Cha...
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作者：Moulin, H; Sprumont, Y
作者单位：Rice University; Universite de Montreal
摘要：Under partial responsibility, the ranking of cost shares should never contradict that of demands. The Solidarity axiom says that if agent i demands more j should not pay more if k pays less. It characterizes the quasi-proportional methods, sharing cost in proportion to 'resealed' demands. Full responsibility, rules out cross-subsidization for additively separable costs. Restricting solidarity to submodular cost characterizes the fixed-flow, methods, containing the Shapley-Shubik and serial met...
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作者：Zhu, T
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：Existence of a monetary steady state is established in a random matching model with divisible goods, divisible money, an arbitrary bound on individual money holdings, and take-it-or-leave-it offers by consumers. The monetary steady state shown to exist has nice properties: the value function, defined on money holdings, is strictly increasing and strictly concave, and the distribution over money holdings has full support. The approach is to show that the limit of the nice steady states for indi...
